Bombay HC Scrutinises FIR Over Anti‑BJP Social Media Posts

**Introduction**

The Bombay High Court has issued notice to the Maharashtra government on a petition filed by UK‑based doctor and YouTuber Dr Sangram Patil, who was detained at Mumbai airport and prevented from travelling after an FIR was registered against him for allegedly objectionable social media posts criticising the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Dr Patil seeks quashing of the FIR and the Look Out Circular (LOC) that led to his detention. The case, now listed for further hearing in February, squarely raises contemporary questions at the intersection of criminal law, constitutional free speech, and the State’s power to restrict international travel. In a digital age where political discourse increasingly occurs on online platforms and many Indian citizens live abroad, the court’s approach will be watched closely for its implications on both substantive speech offences and the procedural safeguards around FIRs and travel restrictions.

**Legal Background**

At the constitutional level, three provisions frame the dispute. Article 19(1)(a) guarantees freedom of speech and expression, subject only to the narrowly tailored restrictions in Article 19(2) (sovereignty and integrity of India, security of the State, public order, decency or morality, contempt of court, defamation, or incitement to an offence). Article 21 protects life and personal liberty and, after Maneka Gandhi v Union of India (1978), has been interpreted to require that any law depriving liberty must be fair, just and reasonable, and must also satisfy Articles 14 and 19. In Satwant Singh Sawhney v Assistant Passport Officer (1967) and Maneka Gandhi, the Supreme Court held that the right to travel abroad is part of “personal liberty”, and that impounding a passport or otherwise blocking travel is permissible only by procedure established by law that meets constitutional standards of non‑arbitrariness and natural justice.

On the free speech side, Kedar Nath Singh v State of Bihar (1962) read down the offence of sedition, holding that mere strong criticism of the government, however intemperate, is protected unless it incites violence or public disorder. In Shreya Singhal v Union of India (2015), the Supreme Court struck down section 66A of the IT Act and reiterated that online expression can be criminalised only where there is a clear tendency to cause public disorder, and that vague notions such as “annoyance” or “offence” to political sensibilities are constitutionally impermissible grounds for criminal prosecution.

Procedurally, registration of an FIR is governed by the Code of Criminal Procedure, but higher courts retain inherent power to quash proceedings where the allegations, taken at face value, do not disclose an offence, or where criminal law is invoked to settle political or private scores. The canonical formulation is found in State of Haryana v Bhajan Lal (1992). LOCs, though administrative in origin, have been brought within judicial scrutiny by High Courts, which have repeatedly held that they must be issued only in accordance with Ministry of Home Affairs guidelines, typically where the person is an absconder, a flight risk, or required for custodial interrogation.

**Critical Analysis**

The petition filed by Dr Patil challenges, in essence, two sets of State actions: the registration of the FIR for his social media posts, and the issuance of an LOC resulting in his detention at the airport and curtailment of his right to travel.

*Substantive speech offence*

The first analytical question is whether the FIR discloses any cognisable offence once the contents are tested against the constitutional standard articulated in Kedar Nath Singh and Shreya Singhal. Robust or even caustic criticism of a ruling party’s ideology, policies or leaders is at the core of the protection afforded by Article 19(1)(a). The European Court of Human Rights has long stressed in cases such as Handyside v United Kingdom (1976) that free expression covers information and ideas that “offend, shock or disturb the State or any sector of the population”. Indian courts have adopted a similar spirit, particularly in S. Rangarajan v P. Jagjivan Ram (1989), insisting that speech cannot be suppressed merely because it is unpalatable or unpopular.

If the FIR is premised solely on the fact that Dr Patil’s videos or posts are sharply critical of the BJP, without any incitement to violence, hatred against protected groups, or specific false imputations of fact satisfying the ingredients of criminal defamation, it will be vulnerable to quashing under the Bhajan Lal framework. The High Court will examine whether the penal provisions invoked—often sections relating to promoting enmity, public mischief, or defamation—have been mechanically applied in a manner that would place political disagreement within the criminal domain. Criminal law is a blunt instrument and, in a constitutional democracy, cannot be used as a surrogate for political rebuttal.

*Use of Look Out Circulars and right to travel*

The second question concerns the LOC which triggered Dr Patil’s detention at Mumbai airport. LOCs are a serious interference with personal liberty. Following Maneka Gandhi, any restriction on the right to travel abroad must conform to a law that is fair, non‑arbitrary, and accompanied by appropriate procedural safeguards, including disclosure of reasons and an opportunity to be heard, save in genuinely urgent situations.

MHA guidelines, as interpreted by High Courts, typically confine LOCs to circumstances where (a) a cognisable offence is under investigation; (b) the person is evading arrest or non‑bailable warrants; or (c) there is credible apprehension that the person will not return to face trial. Applying those criteria to a case of a UK‑resident professional who has appeared at the airport under his own name and is apparently willing to cooperate through counsel, the State will need to demonstrate why an LOC was proportionate. Merely being an accused in a speech‑related case, without more, ordinarily does not justify a blanket prohibition on international travel.

Moreover, as Maneka Gandhi shows, natural justice is read into such powers. Even where a passport is impounded or travel is blocked without prior hearing due to urgency, post‑decisional hearing must be afforded promptly, along with reasons sufficient to enable meaningful challenge. Any unexplained secrecy around the reasons for the LOC or prolonged continuation without periodic review risks being characterised as arbitrary and in breach of Articles 14 and 21.

*Extraterritorial speech and diaspora critics*

A notable feature of this case is that the allegedly offending content appears to have been created and disseminated from outside India. Indian criminal law may still apply where the effects of the speech are felt within India, but the free‑speech calculus must take into account the chilling message sent to members of the Indian diaspora and foreign‑based commentators. If the price of being sharply critical of a political party while abroad is the risk of arrest or travel restrictions on entering India, there is a real risk of self‑censorship inconsistent with the “marketplace of ideas” that a democratic constitution presupposes.

**Opinion & Outlook**

It would be speculative to predict the precise outcome at this interim stage, but certain contours are discernible. On the FIR, the High Court is likely to scrutinise the contents of the social media posts against the strict tests laid down in Kedar Nath Singh and Shreya Singhal. If the allegations do not cross the threshold of incitement to violence or hatred, or of precise defamatory imputations, quashing of the FIR is a realistic possibility. At a minimum, the court may confine the scope of investigation and reiterate that political displeasure cannot be dressed up as criminality.

On the LOC and the airport detention, the court is well‑placed to insist on strict adherence to both statutory safeguards and internal government guidelines. LOCs are properly used in cases of economic offenders, absconding accused, and serious crime; their extension to political speech cases risks normalising a travel‑ban culture inconsistent with Maneka Gandhi’s emphasis on fairness and narrow tailoring. The court may therefore require the State to justify, with concrete facts, why less restrictive measures—such as appearance through video‑conferencing, or an undertaking to cooperate with investigation—would not suffice.

Looking ahead, the case underscores the need for clearer, published standards governing the registration of FIRs in relation to online political speech, and for more detailed, perhaps judicially approved, norms on LOC issuance. Training of police and immigration authorities in constitutional speech standards is essential. Comparative experience from other common law jurisdictions—such as the UK’s careful use of travel restrictions under terrorism legislation, subject to robust judicial oversight—suggests that strong substantive powers can coexist with disciplined procedural safeguards.

**Conclusion**

The proceedings initiated by Dr Sangram Patil offer the Bombay High Court an opportunity to restate two foundational propositions: that criminal law is a last resort, not a convenient answer to political controversy; and that the State’s power to control international travel must be exercised within the strict confines of fairness, reasonableness and non‑arbitrariness laid down in Maneka Gandhi v Union of India. However the individual dispute is resolved, a clear judicial signal on these points would help ensure that the tools of FIRs and LOCs are not repurposed in ways that chill legitimate democratic discourse, whether at home or among Indians abroad.