HIV Injection Assault in Andhra Pradesh: Attempt to Murder or Endangering Life?

Introduction

The reported assault in Kurnool, Andhra Pradesh—where a woman allegedly rammed her scooter into her former partner’s doctor wife and then injected her with HIV‑positive blood procured from a hospital—raises complex and unsettling issues at the intersection of criminal law, medical ethics, and public health. According to news reports, the victim, an assistant professor in a medical college, was attacked in a pre‑planned manner, with the assailant allegedly sourcing HIV‑infected blood through hospital contacts before administering it under the guise of providing help after the collision. Four persons have reportedly been arrested.

While the factual record will evolve as the investigation proceeds, even the provisional narrative calls for a careful legal analysis. The case forces courts and investigators to confront the thorny question of when exposure to, or attempted transmission of, a life‑threatening infection constitutes attempted murder under section 307 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), and when it falls instead within sections 269–270 IPC (acts likely to spread infection of disease dangerous to life). It also engages victim‑protection norms, evidentiary standards for scientific and medical proof, and broader human rights concerns around HIV.

Legal Background

Indian criminal law does not contain a bespoke offence for deliberate transmission of HIV. Prosecutors therefore work within the general framework of the IPC.

Section 299–300 IPC define culpable homicide and murder. Section 307 criminalises an “act” done with such intention or knowledge, and in such circumstances, that if death were caused, the offender would be guilty of murder. It is frequently charged in cases where the means employed—firearms, knives, brutal assaults—are inherently likely to cause death.

Sections 269 and 270 IPC criminalise negligent and “malignant” acts likely to spread infection of a disease dangerous to life. In Mr ‘X’ v Hospital ‘Z’ (1998) 8 SCC 296, the Supreme Court accepted that an HIV‑positive person who knowingly exposes another—e.g. by marriage and unprotected intercourse—can fall within these provisions, and emphasised the endangerment inherent in such conduct. The Court later clarified that its broader remarks on the right to marry were not binding, but its analysis of sections 269–270 remains influential.

In Sabhajeet Maurya v State (NCT of Delhi), CRL.A. 493/2013 (Delhi High Court, 2020), the court considered whether an HIV‑positive step‑father who raped a minor could be convicted for attempted murder under section 307 IPC on the basis of potential HIV transmission. The trial court had so held, but the High Court set aside the section 307 conviction. It held that, absent evidence on actual transmission, on the probability of transmission through the specific acts, and on the likelihood that such infection would “in all probability” cause death, the stringent threshold of section 307 was not met. The court pointed to sections 269–270 as the more appropriate framework for criminalising risky exposure.

Comparative jurisprudence, such as R v Dica [2004] QB 1257 in England and R v Mabior [2012] 2 SCR 584 in Canada, similarly tends to locate HIV transmission within offences of causing grievous bodily harm or aggravated sexual assault, with actual transmission or significant risk being central to liability, and HIV‑positive status often operating as an aggravating factor in sentencing.

Critical Analysis

On the reported facts from Kurnool, several issues arise: intention, nature of the act, medical evidence of risk and transmission, and the correct doctrinal slot for liability.

First, mens rea. The allegation is not of consensual intimacy with non‑disclosure, but of a calculated plan: procuring HIV‑positive blood, engineering a collision, and administering an injection under a pretext. If proved, such conduct is strongly indicative of a specific intent to cause grave harm. There is no plausible benign explanation for such a sequence. Unlike the Sabhajeet Maurya case, where the sexual assaults were linked to loneliness and predatory desire, here the act itself—injecting infected blood—is inherently targeted at causing serious disease.

Second, the nature of the act. Deliberate parenteral exposure to HIV‑positive blood via injection is categorically different, from a risk‑perspective, to unprotected intercourse. International data suggest that per‑act transmission risk from a needlestick with HIV‑infected blood is in the order of tens per 10,000 exposures, substantially higher than most categories of sexual exposure. In Sabhajeet Maurya, the Delhi High Court criticised the trial court for assuming that penetrative sexual intercourse by an HIV‑positive person is “in all probability” fatal; that criticism rested in part on the absence of scientific evidence. In a case like Kurnool, prosecution would be well advised to adduce expert medical testimony on per‑act transmission risk from such injections, the effect of viral load, and the likely clinical consequences if infection occurs.

Third, the question of section 307 IPC. The core inquiry is whether the act, viewed with the accused’s intention and knowledge, is of such a nature that, had death resulted, it would have constituted “murder” under section 300 IPC. Infecting a healthy person with HIV, if successful, undoubtedly causes grievous bodily harm and carries a long‑term risk of premature death; modern antiretroviral therapy, however, significantly alters the prognosis and life expectancy. Following the reasoning in Sabhajeet Maurya, a bare allegation of exposure will not suffice: the prosecution must prove, through credible medical evidence, that (a) the blood used was in fact HIV‑positive, (b) the manner of administration created a very high probability of transmission, and (c) HIV infection, in the circumstances, can be characterised as an injury “sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death”, or at least as so imminently dangerous that death is a probable consequence.

A court might, therefore, be cautious about treating every deliberate HIV exposure as section 307. Yet, the facts here arguably go beyond “likely to spread infection” under sections 269–270. The use of an invasive instrument on an unsuspecting victim, combined with prior procurement of infected blood, aligns more closely with paradigmatic attempts to cause fatal injury—analogous to poisoning, where the substance used is capable of causing death though modern medicine may avert the outcome.

Fourth, causation and proof. If, after the assault, the victim tests HIV‑negative and remains so after the window period, liability for attempt, rather than for causing grievous hurt, becomes central. Courts have repeatedly held that attempt liability does not require the prohibited consequence to occur; what matters is the sufficiently proximate act, coupled with requisite mens rea. In such a scenario, a section 307 charge is more defensible than it was in Sabhajeet Maurya, because the very mode of attack—deliberate injection of infected blood—is more tightly connected to a life‑threatening outcome than sexual exposure, and resembles traditional modes of homicidal attempt.

Conversely, if infection is established, and medical opinion supports that untreated HIV infection is likely to cause death in the ordinary course of nature, the case for treating the conduct as attempted murder becomes stronger still, with sections 269–270 featuring as alternative or lesser charges.

Opinion & Outlook

From a doctrinal standpoint, the Kurnool incident presents an opportunity for Indian courts to draw a principled line between: (i) negligent or reckless conduct that merely creates a risk of disease transmission, and (ii) focused, intrusive acts using disease as a weapon. The Delhi High Court in Sabhajeet Maurya rightly criticised the over‑extension of section 307 to ordinary sexual exposure by an HIV‑positive offender, emphasising the need for evidence rather than assumptions. That caution should remain the baseline.

However, the present facts—if proved as reported—are not about background risk, but about using HIV‑infected blood as an instrument of violence. Analytically, the conduct is closer to poisoning with a toxic substance than to unsafe sex. In such cases, a calibrated use of section 307 is both defensible and normatively desirable, provided expert evidence supports the assessment of risk and likely consequences. Sections 269–270 IPC should nonetheless be charged in the alternative, preserving the court’s ability to convict for endangering life if the evidence falls short of the stringent “murder‑like” threshold.

At the same time, human rights sensitivities around HIV must not be lost. The danger in “weaponisation” cases is that they fuel stigma against persons living with HIV more generally. Courts should continue to stress, as in comparative jurisprudence, that criminal liability attaches to deliberate or reckless endangerment, not to mere status as HIV‑positive. Protective measures for the victim—confidential testing, counselling, prophylaxis, and privacy safeguards—must proceed in tandem with criminal investigation.

Conclusion

The alleged Kurnool assault marks a disturbing evolution in the use of disease as a vector of interpersonal violence. Properly analysed, it engages the most serious provisions of the IPC, but it must be approached with evidential rigour and doctrinal care. Building on the reasoning in Sabhajeet Maurya v State (NCT of Delhi) and Mr ‘X’ v Hospital ‘Z’, Indian courts are likely to distinguish between ordinary risky conduct and weaponised infection. If the facts are substantiated, this case may well become a leading precedent on when deliberate HIV exposure crosses the line into attempted murder, while simultaneously underscoring that the law targets malicious acts, not the condition of living with HIV.