Identity of Child Victims and Public Accountability: The Law Behind the Sriramulu FIR

Introduction

The recent registration of an FIR against former Karnataka minister and BJP leader B Sriramulu, for allegedly disclosing full details of a minor rape victim during a protest in Ballari, brings into sharp focus the stringent Indian legal framework governing the anonymity of sexual offence survivors—especially children. According to press reports, the case has been booked under provisions of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act and Section 228A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), which criminalise the publication of identifying details of victims of certain sexual offences. This episode sits at the intersection of victim protection, political speech, and media reporting, and provides an important opportunity to revisit how courts have interpreted the duties of public figures and institutions when speaking about ongoing criminal cases involving minors.

Legal Background

The principal statutory provisions engaged are Section 228A IPC and Section 23 of the POCSO Act 2012, read with allied procedural safeguards flowing from Article 21 of the Constitution.

Section 228A IPC prohibits the disclosure of the identity of victims of certain sexual offences, including rape, by printing or publishing the victim’s name or any matter which may make their identity known. Conviction can follow where a person, without lawful authority, causes such disclosure. The rationale is to prevent secondary victimisation, social stigma, and intimidation that can deter reporting and cooperation with the criminal justice process.

The POCSO Act contains a more rigorous, child-specific framework. Section 23(1) POCSO bars any person from making a report or presenting comments in any media that may disclose the identity of a child victim of an offence under the Act. “Identity” is defined broadly to include name, address, photograph, family details, school, neighbourhood and other particulars that may lead to identification. Under Section 33(7) POCSO, the Special Court must ensure the child is not exposed in any way to the accused or to the public gaze, and that the child’s identity is kept confidential.

In Nipun Saxena v Union of India (2018), the Supreme Court of India authoritatively clarified that no person, including media and private actors, may publish the identity of rape victims—and that even the courts themselves must be cautious in orders and judgments. For children, the Court stressed that their identity must never be disclosed, and that even indirect identifiers must be avoided.

Critical Analysis

On the limited facts reported, it appears that during a political protest concerning a POCSO case, Sriramulu is alleged to have revealed the minor victim’s full personal details. Hypothetically, if his remarks included the child’s name, exact address, school, or other specific descriptors enabling identification, they would prima facie attract Section 228A IPC (if the underlying offence is one enumerated therein) and Section 23 POCSO, as interpreted by the superior courts.

Doctrine and precedent emphasise that the prohibition is content- and consequence-focused rather than medium-specific. In Gangadhar Narayan Nayak v State of Karnataka (2022), the Supreme Court dealt with a news report naming a child victim. The Court reiterated that Section 23 POCSO is aimed at preventing any reporting that discloses or is likely to disclose the child’s identity, irrespective of format. Similarly, in several High Court decisions—such as Pravin Narsing Jethewad v State of Maharashtra (Bombay High Court, 2026)—posting the child’s identifiable details on social media was treated as falling squarely within Section 23, underscoring that speeches, digital posts, and banners are equally capable of offending.

Nipun Saxena is particularly relevant, as it broadened the understanding of “identity” and underscored the strict liability flavour of Section 228A in practice. The Court held that not only the name but any information leading to the victim’s identification should be withheld; this extends to parents’ names, addresses, photographs, and other circumstantial clues. When a public figure addresses a local audience about a known case and supplies granular details, the risk of re-identification is substantially heightened.

A further issue is whether the act of disclosure must be linked to “publication” in the conventional sense. Courts have generally read “publication” under Section 228A and “report” under Section 23 POCSO broadly, to include oral disclosure that is likely to be communicated more widely, particularly where the speech is made to the media or a large gathering. A political protest, often covered by television and online platforms, is a context in which a speaker can reasonably foresee that their words will be disseminated. If, as commonly occurs, the remarks were recorded and broadcast, both the speaker and the media outlets may incur liability, subject to proof of knowledge and intent.

Human rights jurisprudence also plays a role. The right to privacy and dignity of sexual offence survivors, particularly child victims, is recognised as part of Article 21. In Nipun Saxena, the Supreme Court treated victim anonymity as a constitutional obligation and directed all authorities to ensure compliance. In cases from the Kerala High Court such as Chandra Mouli v State of Kerala (2024), the courts have reiterated that disclosure of identity of child victims can have long-term psychological and social consequences, undermining rehabilitation and reintegration.

Balancing this is the right to freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a). Yet Article 19(2) permits reasonable restrictions in the interests of decency, morality, and contempt of court. The statutory prohibitions in Section 228A IPC and Section 23 POCSO have been understood as precisely such reasonable restrictions. Political speech does not enjoy an absolute immunity from these constraints; indeed, given their influence, politicians are expected to exercise heightened responsibility when dealing with vulnerable complainants.

Opinion & Outlook

The FIR against Sriramulu, viewed through this legal framework, appears to be a predictable enforcement of settled confidentiality norms rather than an expansion of criminal law. While the factual matrix will be tested in investigation and trial, the governing standards are clear: where a child is a complainant in a sexual offence, their identity must be protected comprehensively, and any disclosure—by media, officials, or political leaders—is presumptively unlawful unless expressly authorised by a competent court in the child’s interest.

One foreseeable line of defence may be to argue that the details disclosed were already in the public domain, or that they were insufficient to allow identification beyond the immediate community. However, Nipun Saxena and later High Court decisions take a strict view: even if local knowledge already circulates informally, further publication that facilitates wider dissemination can still violate the statute. Another possible contention is that the intention was to highlight investigative lapses or demand justice. Courts have generally accepted the importance of public scrutiny in such cases, but they have insisted that this can and must be done without compromising anonymity—by using pseudonyms, redacting addresses, and avoiding granular personal descriptors.

Going forward, this incident may encourage renewed training and sensitisation of public officials and political leaders on POCSO and Section 228A compliance. Many state police forces have already issued standing orders to officers and media regarding anonymity; similar protocols aimed at elected representatives and party workers would be a logical extension. In parallel, media organisations may again review their editorial policies to ensure that broadcasting or quoting such statements does not itself amount to an offence.

Conclusion

The case registered against B Sriramulu underscores the non-negotiable nature of statutory and constitutional protections for the identity of child victims of sexual offences. Indian courts, through decisions such as Nipun Saxena v Union of India and Gangadhar Narayan Nayak v State of Karnataka, have developed a robust jurisprudence that prioritises the dignity, privacy, and long-term welfare of survivors over unrestrained public commentary. Whatever the political context of the remarks in Ballari, the law requires that advocacy for justice be conducted without exposing the most vulnerable participants in the process. The outcome of this case will therefore be watched not only for its individual consequences, but for the signal it sends about institutional commitment to child protection in the criminal justice system.