Lookout Circulars, Online Speech and Criminal Process: Mumbai’s Expanding Net

Introduction

The recent detention of UK-based doctor and YouTuber Sangram Patil at Mumbai airport, reportedly pursuant to a lookout circular (LOC) issued over allegedly derogatory social media comments about political leaders, illustrates the growing use of immigration and border-control mechanisms in response to online speech. According to media reports, Patil was stopped when he arrived in India and handed over to the Mumbai Police in connection with offences allegedly arising from his digital content. This episode raises important questions at the intersection of criminal law, free speech, police procedure and the constitutional right to travel. It also highlights how a device originally designed to secure the presence of serious offenders is now being deployed in relation to online expression, sometimes of a political character, thereby calling for closer scrutiny of the applicable legal framework and safeguards.

Legal Background

Lookout circulars are executive instruments used by immigration authorities at the behest of investigating agencies to monitor and, where necessary, detain persons at ports of exit and entry. They are not creatures of statute but derive their operational framework from Office Memoranda issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs and the Bureau of Immigration. Courts have repeatedly treated LOCs as serious intrusions on personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution, because they can effectively restrain an individual’s right to travel, which has been recognised as an aspect of personal liberty.

The Delhi High Court in Priya Parameshwaran Pillai v Union of India (2015) dealt with the use of an LOC to prevent a civil society activist from travelling abroad to brief foreign parliamentarians. The Court held that the executive action, effected through an LOC, violated her fundamental rights under Articles 19(1)(a), 19(1)(g) and 21, and emphasised that restrictions on travel and speech must have a specific statutory basis and satisfy the tests of reasonableness and proportionality. Later decisions – such as Luingam Luithui v Union of India (2017) and a series of Bombay High Court judgments in 2024 including Kannan Vishwanath v Union of India and Chetan Ramniklal Shah v Union of India – have further articulated procedural safeguards, requiring that LOCs be supported by cogent reasons, be proportionate to the alleged offence, and be open to effective judicial review.

Critical Analysis

Against this jurisprudential backdrop, the reported use of an LOC in relation to allegedly offensive social media content invites close constitutional analysis. While full details of the accusations against Patil are not yet publicly available, news accounts suggest that the allegations concern remarks made against political figures rather than threats of violence or incitement to imminent lawless action. Hypothetically, such conduct might be investigated under provisions like sections 153A, 295A or 505 of the Indian Penal Code (now largely re-enacted in the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita), or under information technology–related offences. These are cognisable offences, but they encompass a wide spectrum – from genuinely harmful, hate-filled content to robust, even harsh political criticism.

The first question is one of necessity and proportionality. The Delhi High Court in Priya Pillai insisted that restraints on travel must respond to a legitimate aim, be sanctioned by law, and be the least restrictive means available. LOCs were initially envisaged for persons involved in serious economic or organised crimes who were likely to abscond, thereby frustrating the criminal process. Using the same instrument for online speech offences – particularly where the accused is a professional with known foreign residence and may be willing to cooperate with the investigation – risks normalising a disproportionate response. Alternatives such as electronic summons, cooperation through counsel, or even non-bailable warrants (in appropriate cases) exist within the Code of Criminal Procedure without pre-emptively curtailing cross-border movement.

Secondly, the deployment of an LOC in a speech-related case can have a chilling effect on digital expression, especially of political dissent. In Shreya Singhal v Union of India (2015), the Supreme Court underscored that vague or overbroad restrictions on speech, backed by criminal sanction, impermissibly deter legitimate expression. While that decision struck down section 66A of the IT Act, its broader reasoning – that penal consequences and police powers should not be used in a manner that suppresses lawful criticism – is highly relevant. The threat that one’s social media activity might trigger an international travel restraint, in addition to criminal process, amplifies this chilling effect.

Thirdly, the procedural character of an LOC merits emphasis. Courts have held that an LOC is not a secret weapon immune from scrutiny. In Priya Pillai and subsequent Delhi and Bombay High Court cases, petitioners successfully challenged LOCs on the ground that they were neither properly authorised nor justified by material on record. The 2010 Office Memorandum, as later clarified, requires that the originating agency record specific reasons and periodically review continuation of an LOC. If, in the present matter, the LOC was issued merely because an FIR was registered, without individualised assessment of flight risk or the gravity of the alleged offence, it would be vulnerable to challenge as arbitrary.

A fourth dimension is the interface between criminal law and political process. Indian courts have repeatedly recognised, following decisions such as Kedar Nath Singh v State of Bihar (1962) on sedition and more recent free-speech jurisprudence, that criticism of the government or political leaders, however pungent, is protected unless it crosses into incitement to violence or public disorder. If the allegations against Patil concern sharp but non-violent criticism, then not only the substantive offences but also the collateral use of LOCs may be seen as an overreach, incompatible with the high value placed on political speech in a constitutional democracy.

Opinion & Outlook

From a criminal process perspective, the increasing resort to LOCs in online speech cases reveals a broader trend of using coercive measures at the very threshold of investigation. This may be tactically convenient for enforcement agencies, particularly where the accused resides abroad, but it calls for judicial reaffirmation of first principles: that pre-trial measures must be narrowly tailored to secure presence at investigation and trial, not to punish or stigmatise in advance. The Bombay High Court’s 2024 line of authority, insisting on reasoned, individualised LOCs, is a positive development, but its principles must now be applied to contemporary digital-speech prosecutions.

Constitutionally, any LOC that operates as an indirect sanction on disfavoured speech should attract a high level of scrutiny. Following the approach in Priya Pillai and Shreya Singhal, courts are likely to examine whether there exists a clear statutory basis for curtailing travel; whether the underlying offence itself respects the boundaries of Article 19(2); and whether the measure is proportionate in light of the gravity of the allegations and the conduct of the accused. Where the speech in question is political commentary addressed to an online audience, an additional layer of protection should apply, given the centrality of such expression to democratic deliberation.

Going forward, it would be desirable for the Union Government to update the LOC guidelines to expressly address digital offences and fundamental-rights considerations. Explicit thresholds – for example, limiting LOCs in speech cases to situations involving clear threats to national security, public order or the administration of justice – would align practice with constitutional norms. In parallel, High Courts, when approached in writ jurisdiction, can continue to refine the jurisprudence by requiring disclosure of LOC grounds, time-bound review, and, where appropriate, damages for wrongful restraint.

Conclusion

The reported detention of a UK-based YouTuber in Mumbai on the strength of an LOC tied to online comments against political leaders is more than an isolated incident; it is a window into how police powers are adapting to the digital age, sometimes in ways that strain constitutional boundaries. LOCs, once exceptional tools against absconding offenders, are increasingly being used in the fraught terrain of online speech. Indian constitutional and criminal jurisprudence – from Priya Parameshwaran Pillai to Shreya Singhal and the recent Bombay High Court LOC cases – provides a robust framework to test such uses against the standards of legality, necessity and proportionality. Applying those standards rigorously will be essential to ensure that the enforcement of criminal law in cyberspace does not come at the undue cost of personal liberty and free expression.