Minneapolis Agent Shooting: Legal Standards on Police Use of Force

# Minneapolis Agent Shooting: Legal Standards on Police Use of Force

## Introduction

The fatal shooting of Alex Pretti by federal immigration agents in Minneapolis has rapidly become a focal point in the continuing debate over police use of lethal force in the United States. According to reports, the Trump administration has publicly backed the agents involved while indicating that it is “reviewing everything”. At the same time, bystander videos circulating online appear to contradict aspects of the official account. Minnesota officials have confirmed that Pretti held a valid state permit to carry a concealed firearm, a right strengthened by the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2022 decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v Bruen.

This convergence of federal power, armed civilian self-defence rights and contested evidence raises core criminal law questions: when is lethal police force lawful, what standards govern its investigation, and how should courts treat conflicting narratives between officers and civilian witnesses? The answers will carry significant implications for both accountability and officer safety.

## Legal Background

In U.S. law, the starting point is the Fourth Amendment, which prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. A police shooting is treated as a “seizure” of the person, and its legality turns on whether the force used was objectively reasonable in all the circumstances.

Two U.S. Supreme Court decisions are central. In Tennessee v Garner 471 US 1 (1985), the Court held that deadly force may not be used to prevent the escape of a fleeing suspect unless the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer or others. In Graham v Connor 490 US 386 (1989), the Court framed the test of excessive force as one of “objective reasonableness” judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, allowing for the fact that decisions are often made in tense, rapidly evolving situations.

Criminal liability for officers typically arises under state homicide offences and, at the federal level, under 18 USC § 242 (deprivation of rights under colour of law). Civil liability for damages is pursued via 42 USC § 1983, constrained by qualified immunity where the law was not “clearly established”.

Comparative common law and human rights jurisprudence emphasise similar themes. The European Court of Human Rights, in McCann v United Kingdom (1995) 21 EHRR 97, held that the use of lethal force must be “no more than absolutely necessary” and imposed a procedural obligation on states to conduct an effective, independent investigation into any potentially unlawful death at the hands of agents of the state. The Supreme Court of India, in People’s Union for Civil Liberties v State of Maharashtra (2014) 10 SCC 635, issued detailed guidelines for the investigation of police “encounter” killings, treating them as law under Article 141 of the Constitution and linking them explicitly to the right to life under Article 21.

Across jurisdictions, therefore, two pillars recur: strict substantive limits on lethal force and a robust procedural duty to investigate.

## Critical Analysis

On the limited public reporting, several key legal issues arise in the Pretti shooting. Some facts remain unclear and must, at this stage, be treated as hypothetical: whether Pretti brandished or reached for his firearm; whether agents issued clear warnings; the distance and positioning between parties; and whether Pretti was attempting to flee or surrender when shot. Each of these matters is potentially dispositive under both U.S. and comparative legal standards.

First, the mere fact that Pretti lawfully carried a concealed firearm, even under a regime strengthened by Bruen, does not by itself justify lethal force. Under Garner and Graham, officers must still have probable cause to believe that he posed an imminent threat of serious harm. However, the widespread legality of concealed carry complicates the assessment of threat: officers now operate in environments where the presence of a firearm is more common but not necessarily indicative of criminal intent.

If, for example, Pretti’s weapon remained holstered and he made no movement reasonably interpretable as reaching for it, the constitutional justification for lethal force would be weak. Bystander videos purporting to show hands visible or raised, or the absence of an apparent lunge toward the waistband, would weigh heavily against a claim of imminent threat. Conversely, if credible evidence shows a sudden movement consistent with drawing a gun in close proximity to officers, Graham’s deference to split-second judgments may apply in the agents’ favour.

Secondly, the conflicting narratives between officers and civilians bring the evidential value of bystander recordings to the forefront. U.S. courts have recognised the importance of video evidence in assessing reasonableness; in Scott v Harris 550 US 372 (2007), the Supreme Court relied heavily on dashcam footage to reject the plaintiff’s version of events. Yet video is not self-explanatory. Frame rate, angle, obstructions and what occurs outside the frame must be analysed with care. A proper legal assessment requires forensic video analysis, synchronisation with audio, and correlation with ballistics and medical evidence.

Thirdly, the question of investigation is not ancillary but central to the legality of the state’s response. While U.S. constitutional doctrine does not mirror the explicit procedural obligations found in European or Indian jurisprudence, there is increasing recognition—both domestically and comparatively—that a credible, independent investigation is essential where the state has taken life. The PUCL guidelines for encounter deaths in India, for example, call for registration of a First Information Report, independent investigation by a separate team or agency, preservation of the crime scene, mandatory magisterial inquiry, prompt reporting to human rights commissions and, where warranted, prosecution and compensation.

Translating those principles to the Minneapolis context points toward best practices: immediate referral to an independent investigative body (such as a state Bureau of Criminal Apprehension or a specially constituted unit), separation of involved officers, prompt seizing and forensic testing of weapons, compulsory autopsy, and full collection of CCTV and civilian video. Public statements from political leaders “backing” the agents before such a process has run its course risk undermining the perceived neutrality of any subsequent inquiry, even if, as a matter of doctrine, they do not themselves determine criminal liability.

Finally, there is the interaction between criminal and administrative outcomes. Even if prosecutors ultimately conclude that the Garner/Graham threshold for criminal charges is not met, internal disciplinary standards and civil rights scrutiny remain relevant. In line with McCann and subsequent Strasbourg case law, a state can breach its procedural obligations even where individual officers are acquitted, if the investigation is deficient in independence, thoroughness or transparency.

## Opinion & Outlook

From a criminal law perspective, the decisive questions will be factual rather than abstract: did the agents honestly and reasonably perceive an imminent threat, and does the objective record—videos, forensics, witness accounts—support that perception? Until the full evidential picture is assembled, categorical conclusions would be premature. However, the surrounding context suggests several broader legal trajectories.

First, jurisdictions with liberalised carry laws must refine use-of-force training and policy to distinguish between the mere presence of a weapon and behaviour indicative of imminent aggression. Failure to do so risks a de facto rule that armed civilians, even those exercising lawfully conferred rights, are per se more expendable—a position difficult to reconcile with Bruen’s robust conception of self-defence rights.

Secondly, the case underscores the desirability of codified investigative protocols for deaths in custody or at the hands of law enforcement—analogous to the PUCL guidelines and informed by instruments such as the Minnesota Protocol on the Investigation of Potentially Unlawful Death (2016). Even if not constitutionally mandated, legislating such procedures at federal or state level would promote consistency and public confidence.

Thirdly, the availability of multi-angle video evidence will likely continue to shape the standard of reasonableness. Courts may in time refine Graham’s deference to “split-second” judgments when high-quality recordings show a materially different reality from officers’ recollections. Recent Commonwealth and European jurisprudence already exhibits a greater willingness to interrogate discrepancies between official accounts and objective recordings.

In the immediate term, prosecutors in Minnesota will need to decide whether the evidential threshold for charges is met under state homicide statutes and whether a federal civil rights investigation under 18 USC § 242 is warranted. That assessment should be insulated, as far as practicable, from prior political endorsements of the agents’ conduct.

## Conclusion

The Minneapolis shooting of Alex Pretti sits at the intersection of expanding civilian gun rights, contested police narratives and evolving evidentiary technology. The governing legal framework—anchored in Garner and Graham in the United States and mirrored by right-to-life jurisprudence in cases such as McCann v United Kingdom and PUCL v State of Maharashtra—demands both substantive restraint in the use of lethal force and a procedurally rigorous, independent investigation whenever the state takes life. Whatever the eventual factual findings, the case will stand as another test of whether legal institutions can maintain that balance between effective law enforcement and the non-derogable right to life.