Supreme Court Condemns ‘Stock Witnesses’: A Turning Point for Police Investigations

Introduction

In a recent order in Anwar Hussain v State of Madhya Pradesh (SLP (Crl.) No. 14087 of 2025), the Supreme Court of India has taken the unusual step of directing the immediate removal of a Station House Officer (SHO) from investigative duties. The Court did so after finding, prima facie, that the officer repeatedly used the same “stock witnesses” across multiple criminal cases and was also implicated in an incident of unlawful detention and handcuffing. The Court described the practice of stock witnesses as “anathema to a country governed by the rule of law,” signalling strong institutional disapproval. This development, which has already been reported in the legal press, has important ramifications for police practice, evidentiary integrity, and the protection of fundamental rights under Article 21 of the Constitution.

Legal Background

The Supreme Court’s interim order, dated 13 January 2026, arises from an SLP challenging a Madhya Pradesh High Court decision in MCRC No. 11236 of 2025. During the proceedings, the Court examined the conduct of the SHO posted at Police Station Chandan Nagar, Indore. The bench of Ahsanuddin Amanullah J and R. Mahadevan J recorded that the officer had, prima facie, resorted to “repeated use of the same witnesses in support of the police versions of alleged crimes,” characterising these individuals as “stock witnesses”.

This fits within a wider body of Indian criminal jurisprudence that insists upon fair, impartial investigation as an essential facet of Article 21. In cases such as Babubhai v State of Gujarat (2010) and Zahira Habibullah Sheikh v State of Gujarat (2006), the Supreme Court has recognised that a tainted or partisan investigation can fatally compromise a fair trial. Although there is no express statutory prohibition on the use of the same witness in different cases, courts have consistently warned that manufactured or tutored testimony undermines the credibility of the entire prosecution case under the Indian Evidence Act 1872.

In parallel, the bench took note of a contemporaneous order of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Akash Tiwari v State of Madhya Pradesh (WP No. 46745 of 2025), where the same SHO admitted to detaining and handcuffing an individual without any registered offence or judicial authorisation. The High Court found this to be a gross violation of the detainee’s fundamental rights under Article 21 and called for both departmental and criminal action. Against this backdrop, the Supreme Court’s intervention links improper investigative tactics, misuse of witnesses, and custodial illegality as part of a pattern of conduct.

Critical Analysis

The Court’s description of “stock witnesses” as anathema to the rule of law is carefully chosen and doctrinally significant. Under Sections 118 and 155 of the Evidence Act, the competence and credibility of a witness are distinct matters: a witness may be competent to testify but still be disbelieved if their evidence appears interested, rehearsed, or otherwise unreliable. The repeated appearance of the same individuals as eyewitnesses or panch witnesses across unrelated cases naturally invites an inference of fabrication. By characterising this practice as striking at the “very root of fairness and impartiality of investigation”, the Supreme Court is signalling that such systemic misuse may vitiate not only individual trials but the integrity of the criminal process itself.

While the present order is interim and the Court has expressly described its findings as tentative, the remedial response is noteworthy. The SHO has been directed to be posted to the police lines without any investigative or supervisory duties, and the Commissioner of Police, Indore, has been made personally answerable for any further interference by the officer in police station matters. This resonates with earlier jurisprudence where superior officers have been held accountable for failing to curb custodial excesses, such as in D.K. Basu v State of West Bengal (1997). Here, the Court is effectively using administrative reallocation as a prophylactic measure to protect ongoing and future investigations from contamination.

The reliance on the High Court’s orders in Akash Tiwari further underscores an important constitutional point: unlawful detention and handcuffing without judicial sanction offend the dignity component of Article 21. The Supreme Court’s willingness to consider this parallel record in assessing the SHO’s conduct aligns with the principle that the right to life and personal liberty includes protection against arbitrary and degrading treatment by law enforcement. The Court’s reasoning suggests that an officer who is prepared to detain and handcuff without lawful authority may be equally prepared to deploy stock witnesses to secure convictions, thereby presenting a broader risk to the criminal justice system.

From a procedural standpoint, the order illustrates how constitutional courts can deploy interim directions to preserve the integrity of proceedings. Instead of waiting for a final adjudication on culpability, the bench has acted on a precautionary basis, acknowledging the potential for ongoing prejudice if the officer were allowed to continue investigating cases. This is comparable, in principle, to the transfer of investigations to independent agencies such as the CBI where local police are found compromised, though here the Court has opted for a more tailored, officer-specific intervention.

The decision also raises questions about systemic safeguards against stock witnesses. Under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973, there is little in the way of structured oversight on the identity and recurrence of witnesses across cases. In practice, it is left to defence counsel and trial courts to expose patterns through cross-examination and appreciation of evidence. The Supreme Court’s strong language may encourage trial courts to be more searching when confronted with recurring witnesses and may embolden accused persons to seek further investigation or re-investigation where such patterns emerge.

Opinion & Outlook

In professional terms, this order should be read as a warning shot to policing practices that treat witnesses as interchangeable instruments rather than independent narrators of fact. If the Supreme Court, upon final hearing, were to articulate a more detailed set of principles on the misuse of stock witnesses, it could effectively establish a new standard for assessing investigative impartiality. Such standards might include a presumption of suspicion where the same witness appears in multiple unrelated prosecutions from the same police station within a short time frame, placing a higher burden on the prosecution to corroborate their testimony.

There is also scope for institutional reform. Police manuals and standing orders could be amended to require internal vetting whenever the same individual is proposed as a witness in multiple cases, coupled with mandatory supervisory approval and documentation of justification. Additionally, improved digital case-management systems could flag recurrent witness names across FIRs in a district, enabling both internal audits and judicial scrutiny.

In relation to custodial rights, the case reinforces established law that handcuffing without judicial order is impermissible save in exceptional, recorded circumstances, and that unlawful detention is actionable not merely in damages but also through departmental and criminal proceedings. If the High Court in Akash Tiwari ultimately mandates prosecution or significant disciplinary sanctions, and the Supreme Court echoes these concerns in Anwar Hussain, the combined effect could be a meaningful deterrent against routine violations.

Looking ahead, one might reasonably anticipate further petitions emerging from other jurisdictions alleging similar practices of stock witnesses and illegal detention. Constitutional courts may increasingly be asked to intervene at the investigative stage where patterns of misconduct are credibly alleged. The jurisprudential direction suggested by this order is that such intervention is compatible with, and indeed required by, the guarantee of a fair trial under Article 21.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s interim order in Anwar Hussain v State of Madhya Pradesh marks an important moment in the jurisprudence on investigative fairness and police accountability. By explicitly condemning the use of stock witnesses and responding decisively to parallel findings of unlawful detention and handcuffing, the Court has reaffirmed that criminal justice in a constitutional democracy cannot rest on manufactured evidence or custodial illegality. Whether or not the final judgment elaborates broader guidelines, this intervention is likely to influence how trial courts scrutinise recurring witnesses and how police leadership manage officers whose conduct threatens the integrity of investigations and the rights of the accused.