Supreme Court’s Rebuke of ‘Stock Witnesses’ and Police Practices

## Supreme Court’s Rebuke of ‘Stock Witnesses’ and Police Practices

### Introduction

In a recent decision arising from Indore, the Supreme Court of India ordered the removal of a Station House Officer (SHO) from investigative duties after finding that he had repeatedly relied on the same set of “stock witnesses” across multiple criminal cases. The Court described the practice of using stock witnesses as “anathema” to a country governed by the rule of law, and directed that the officer be posted to police lines without any role in investigation or supervision pending further orders. This intervention goes beyond the facts of a single case. It touches the core of criminal justice: the integrity of police investigation and the reliability of evidence that ultimately determines whether an accused is convicted or acquitted.

### Legal Background

The Supreme Court’s observations sit at the intersection of criminal procedure, evidentiary rules, and constitutional guarantees. Under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC), the police are entrusted with the duty of fair, impartial, and diligent investigation (Sections 154–173). The investigating officer is not a partisan adversary but a public official charged with collecting all relevant evidence—both inculpatory and exculpatory—and placing it before the court.

The Indian Evidence Act, 1872, frames how witness testimony is evaluated. While there is no statutory category called a “stock witness,” several provisions are engaged when the same individual appears repeatedly in different prosecutions. Sections 146 and 155 permit extensive cross‑examination to test credibility, expose prior inconsistent statements, and demonstrate that a witness is “habitually” appearing for the police. Section 114 allows the court to draw adverse presumptions against testimony that appears unnatural or contrived.

Constitutionally, Article 21 guarantees that no person shall be deprived of life or personal liberty except according to “procedure established by law,” which the Supreme Court has consistently interpreted to mean fair, just, and reasonable procedure. In decisions such as Zahira Habibullah Sheikh v State of Gujarat, the Court underscored that a fair investigation and a fair trial are integral facets of Article 21. Similarly, in State of Punjab v Baldev Singh, the Court warned that procedural shortcuts and manipulative practices by investigators vitiate the administration of criminal justice.

Against this framework, the use of stock witnesses—individuals repeatedly marshalled by the same officer to support very different prosecutions—raises a serious question: is the investigation genuinely evidence‑led, or evidence‑manufactured?

### Critical Analysis

According to the news report, the Supreme Court was confronted with a pattern in which a particular SHO from Indore had frequently used the same set of ostensibly “independent” witnesses in a range of cases. While the full judgment is not yet available in the public domain, the Court’s reaction—ordering immediate removal from field duties and deprecating the practice in strong terms—indicates that it considered this pattern incompatible with a fair criminal process. (If, hypothetically, the Court also noted that these witnesses were shown as chance witnesses at different locations without plausible justification, that would further reinforce its scepticism.)

The label “stock witness” is important. Indian courts have long been wary of so‑called “chance”, “interested” or “planted” witnesses. A witness who appears too often, in too many unrelated cases, with too convenient a vantage point, invites the inference that their evidence is not organic but orchestrated. When the same investigating officer repeatedly presents such individuals as neutral witnesses—for example, to recoveries under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, to spot identifications, or to alleged confessions—the risk is that the trial becomes a performance based on pre‑fabricated scripts rather than a genuine reconstruction of events.

By calling stock witnesses an “anathema”, the Supreme Court has elevated this from a mere evidentiary concern to a systemic one. The Court is effectively saying that such practices erode public confidence in the criminal process itself. An accused person is entitled not only to a fair trial in court, but also to an honest investigation that does not rely on professional witnesses willing to sign whatever the case diary demands.

The direction to remove the SHO from investigative duties is also significant. Ordinarily, questions of posting, transfer, and disciplinary control over police lie with the executive. Courts are cautious about entering that domain. However, where the court finds that the conduct of an officer directly undermines the fairness of ongoing or future criminal proceedings, it may fashion preventive and remedial directions. The present order signals that when investigative malpractice threatens the integrity of evidence, judicial intervention is both permissible and, at times, necessary.

Comparative common law jurisdictions take a similar view of tainted investigative practices. In the United Kingdom, under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE) and its Codes of Practice, systematic misuse of informants or contrived evidence can lead to exclusion of evidence or even a stay of proceedings as an abuse of process. In R v H [2004] 2 AC 134, the House of Lords emphasised that non‑disclosure and manipulation of evidence by investigators can fundamentally distort the trial. Nigerian and other Commonwealth courts, too, have warned that convictions cannot rest on evidence procured through collusion between police and professional witnesses.

The human rights dimension is clear. An accused potentially faces long periods of pre‑trial detention and the stigma of criminal prosecution. If the foundation of the case rests on stock witnesses with dubious independence, Article 21’s promise of a fair, reasonable process is at risk. Equally, victims and society at large are ill‑served when convictions are secured on shaky, easily impeachable testimony, leaving judgments vulnerable to appellate reversal.

### Opinion & Outlook

The Supreme Court’s response appears both strong and proportionate. It does not prematurely decide every case in which these witnesses have appeared; that remains the function of the trial courts and appellate courts assessing evidence on the record. Instead, it targets the source of the problem—the investigative pattern—by removing the officer from active investigation and sending a clear signal that the judiciary will not tolerate institutional reliance on stock witnesses.

Going forward, one can reasonably expect several developments. First, defence counsel will be emboldened to more aggressively probe the background of so‑called independent witnesses, particularly in cases emerging from the same police station or officer. Systematic cross‑examination to expose repeat appearances, prior associations with the police, or financial inducements may become more common.

Second, police leadership will likely feel pressure to strengthen internal controls. This could include maintaining centralised digital records of panch and independent witnesses, randomising selection of local witnesses for searches and recoveries, and prohibiting officers from repeatedly using the same individuals without senior‑level approval and recorded justification. Training modules at police academies should now explicitly address why stock witnesses undermine both convictions and public trust.

Third, legislatures and policy‑makers may consider codifying certain safeguards in subordinate legislation or police manuals. For instance, a requirement that any independent witness used more than a specified number of times in a given period must be disclosed as such to the court; or that the case diary identify any prior appearances of that witness in other investigations handled by the same officer. While such measures cannot wholly eliminate abuse, they create an audit trail.

Finally, for courts, this decision may mark a shift towards more structural remedies when they encounter investigative malpractice. Rather than merely commenting on credibility in the case at hand, higher courts might increasingly order departmental inquiries, recommend disciplinary action, or, in extreme cases, direct independent or specialised agencies to take over investigation where systemic issues are apparent.

### Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s condemnation of stock witnesses and its decision to strip an Indore SHO of investigative duties underscore a fundamental proposition: criminal justice cannot be built on manufactured testimony. By asserting that such practices are incompatible with a polity governed by law, the Court has reaffirmed the centrality of fair investigation to the right to a fair trial. Whether this intervention produces the necessary institutional reforms will depend on how police leadership, trial courts, and the bar respond. But the message is unambiguous: the era of casual reliance on professional witnesses, if not over, is now under intense and justified judicial scrutiny.