Article 21 Keeps Growing: Internet Access, Safe Footpaths and a Tighter Article 22 Leave the Court With a Remedy-Heavy Docket

The headline: a fundamental right to the internet

According to LiveLaw's report, the Supreme Court has declared that the right to access and use the internet is a fundamental right under Articles 21 and 19(1)(a), and that it extends to children. If the full judgment bears out the report, this is the most consequential Part III development of the year. It also sits within a broader 2026 pattern: the Court is converting abstract Article 21 guarantees into concrete, enforceable entitlements.

Caveat first: this analysis rests on published reports and roundups. Before citing any of this in court, read the operative paragraphs, especially to see what is ratio and what is obiter.

Why the internet ruling matters more than it looks

The doctrinal groundwork was already there. In Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India (2020) 3 SCC 637, the Court held that freedom of speech and the right to carry on trade through the internet enjoy Article 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(g) protection, and that indefinite shutdowns are impermissible. The Kerala High Court went further in Faheema Shirin v. State of Kerala (2019), treating internet access as part of Article 21. A declaration from the Supreme Court settles that split in approach.

For practitioners, the real question is what a right, as opposed to a mere facilitator of rights, does to the proportionality analysis. Three consequences are worth watching:

• Shutdown orders. Orders under Section 5(2) of the Telegraph Act and the Telecom Suspension Rules will face more demanding scrutiny. The state must now justify a shutdown against a standalone right, not just as an incidental burden on speech.
• Education and welfare delivery. Digital-only schemes, e-filing mandates and online-only admission or benefit portals become vulnerable to exclusion challenges. The inclusion of children signals that the Court sees access as tied to education under Article 21A.
• Conditions in custody, institutions and schools. Blanket restrictions, whether imposed by a school, a hostel or an authority, will need a reasoned, proportionate basis.

I would caution against over-reading. Declaring a right is easy. The hard litigation is in the exceptions: age-appropriate regulation, content blocking under Section 69A of the IT Act, and the interplay with the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023. Expect the next wave of petitions to test where "access" ends and "unfettered access" begins.

The same theme: the right to walk

In June 2026, the Court reportedly held that the "primary right of movement under Article 19(1)(d)" includes a fundamental right to walk on safe, clearly marked footpaths. This is Article 21 doctrine in its most practical form. Since Maneka Gandhi (1978), "life" has meant more than animal existence, and the Court has used that reading to compel municipal and infrastructure compliance.

The significance is in the remedy. Pedestrian-safety litigation has long been a PIL staple, but petitioners were left arguing statutory duties under municipal law and the Motor Vehicles Act. A framed fundamental right allows direct Article 32 and Article 226 relief against civic bodies and highway authorities. The April 2026 interim directions on highway safety, which linked commuter safety to Article 21, point the same way. Municipal counsel should expect more compliance-monitoring orders and fewer defences based on resource constraints.

Article 22: the quieter, sharper development

For criminal practitioners, the September 2026 roundup may matter more than either headline ruling. The Court reportedly held that a breach of Article 22(1) renders the arrest unconstitutional, and that public-law compensation may be available for violation of Article 22(2).

This fits the line of authority from Joginder Kumar (1994) and D.K. Basu (1997) through Arnesh Kumar (2014) and the recent decisions in Pankaj Bansal (2023) and Prabir Purkayastha (2024), which insisted that grounds of arrest be communicated in writing. The Court is treating these safeguards as substantive constitutional conditions on liberty, not procedural niceties. Public-law compensation, per Rudul Sah (1983) and Nilabati Behera (1993), is the enforcement mechanism that gives the rule teeth.

If an arrest that violates Article 22(1) is unconstitutional rather than merely irregular, the remand stage becomes the first and best battleground, and the compliance record under Section 47 of the BNSS becomes central evidence.

Practical takeaway: when seeking bail or opposing remand, build the record on timing of production before the magistrate, communication of grounds, and access to counsel. A defect here is no longer a point to be cured by the chargesheet. It supports a compensation claim.

Article 142 and the protest FIRs

The Court's use of Article 142 to quash FIRs arising from peaceful NEET-UG 2026 protests, along with a direction to work toward a pan-India compensation policy, is welcome in outcome but uncomfortable in method. Complete justice under Article 142 has repeatedly been invoked to fill gaps. A national compensation policy, however, edges toward legislative design. Lawyers should be ready for both the benefit, which is speedy relief for protesters, and the precedent problem, which is that Article 142 is not a substitute for Section 528 of the BNSS (earlier Section 482 CrPC) or for a considered statutory scheme.

Other threads to track

• Human Rights Courts. The reported holding that complainants may approach Human Rights Courts directly, without a prior Commission inquiry, upholding Rule 6 of the Karnataka rules, widens access to a forum that has been underused.
• Successive FIRs. The February 2026 Article 32 relief against serial FIRs used to prolong custody reinforces the bar on abuse of process under Articles 14, 19 and 21.
• Transgender Persons (Amendment) Act, 2026. The pending challenge, arguing that removal of self-identification violates Articles 14, 15, 19 and 21, will test whether the Court holds the state to NALSA v. Union of India (2014) and Puttaswamy (2017) on identity and dignity. This is the one to watch for a constitution bench reference.

Bottom line

The Court's 2026 approach is consistent: name the right, attach a remedy, and monitor compliance. That is good for litigants, but it raises a legitimate concern about judicial overreach into policy design. For practitioners, the strategic lesson is to plead rights-based claims with specific, enforceable relief, and to document state non-compliance carefully, because this Court appears willing to turn that record into compensation and continuing mandamus.