Delay Tactics and Fair Trial: Chandigarh Stalking Case Back in Focus

Introduction

A Chandigarh court has recently dismissed an application by Vikas Barala – son of a sitting BJP MP and former Haryana party chief – and co-accused Ashish Kumar, seeking forensic examination of certain documents in the 2017 Chandigarh stalking case. The court found that no useful purpose would be served by sending the documents for examination and that the plea appeared aimed primarily at delaying the trial. This development returns to public attention a case that has, from the outset, raised sensitive questions about gender-based harassment, abuse of political influence, and the integrity of the criminal process. It also offers a useful lens through which to examine how Indian courts handle dilatory tactics in trials involving offences against women, particularly under Section 354D of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and allied provisions.

Legal Background

The 2017 incident involved the alleged stalking and attempted abduction of a young woman in Chandigarh, then widely reported as the “Varnika Kundu” case. The core substantive provisions said to be engaged include Section 354D IPC (stalking), along with provisions relating to criminal intimidation and attempted kidnapping/abduction (hypothetical where not part of the final charge-sheet). Section 354D criminalises following or contacting a woman repeatedly, despite clear indications of disinterest, or monitoring her use of electronic communication. It was introduced after the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 2013 as part of a wider suite of reforms following the Delhi gang rape case, aiming to recognise and criminalise persistent harassment that may precede more serious offences.

Procedurally, the case has also drawn the attention of the Punjab and Haryana High Court. In Ranjan Lakhanpal v Union of India & Others (2017), a public interest petition sought transfer of investigation to the Central Bureau of Investigation alleging dilution of offences and preferential treatment to the accused. The High Court declined to intervene at the investigation stage, particularly when the victim had not herself challenged the investigation or alleged disability in approaching the court. That decision underscores a familiar principle: constitutional courts are cautious about stepping into ongoing investigations unless there is clear evidence of mala fides, institutional bias, or a failure of investigative duty.

More recently, appellate courts across India have had occasion to address delay tactics in criminal trials. In Mungana Vinayaka Venkata Satya Durga Prasad v State of Andhra Pradesh (2024), the Andhra Pradesh High Court, dealing with a stalking case under Section 354D IPC, criticised the accused’s persistent non-appearance and found that he was “retarding the trial process” through indiscipline and dilatory conduct. While the court ultimately cancelled a non-bailable warrant subject to conditions and costs, it emphasised the imperative of expeditious trials, particularly in older cases involving offences against women.

Critical Analysis

Against this backdrop, the Chandigarh court’s rejection of Barala’s and Kumar’s application for forensic examination of documents can be situated within the broader judicial intolerance for tactics that appear more strategic than substantive. Although the detailed reasoning of the recent order is not fully reproduced in media accounts, two points are notable from the limited reporting: first, the court’s finding that no useful purpose would be served by such an examination; and second, the explicit observation that the plea seemed designed to delay the proceedings.

Under the Code of Criminal Procedure, trial courts possess broad discretion to summon documents, recall witnesses, and order forensic analysis where such steps are necessary for a just decision. That discretion, however, is not unbounded. The court must be satisfied that the additional evidence sought is relevant, material, and not a mere fishing expedition. Particularly at an advanced stage of trial, requests that would effectively re-open settled aspects of the evidentiary record are scrutinised closely.

In cases such as Mungana Vinayaka, High Courts have affirmed that while an accused has a right to a fair trial, including adequate opportunity to cross-examine witnesses and challenge documentary evidence, this does not translate into a licence to indefinitely prolong proceedings. The Supreme Court in cases like P. Ramachandra Rao v State of Karnataka has highlighted the constitutional dimension of the right to speedy trial under Article 21, which attaches not only to the accused but also to victims and society at large. Where delay is attributable primarily to the defence, courts are justified in curbing procedural manoeuvres that undermine that constitutional mandate.

The high-profile nature of the Chandigarh stalking case intensifies these concerns. Allegations of political influence and initial dilution of charges have already placed the criminal justice system under scrutiny. Any perception that the trial is being deliberately stalled risks further eroding public confidence, particularly among women who observe how complaints of harassment are handled when the accused enjoy social or political capital. Conversely, courts must remain vigilant to ensure that their desire for expedition does not eclipse legitimate defence rights; the touchstone must always be whether a particular step is genuinely necessary for a fair adjudication of guilt or innocence.

Applying these principles, a request for forensic examination of documents filed nearly nine years after the incident and at a late stage of the trial (hypothetical timing, based on media description) naturally invites scepticism. Unless the defence can demonstrate (i) that the authenticity or authorship of those documents has only now been called into question for objectively justifiable reasons, and (ii) that the proposed forensic analysis could materially affect the outcome, courts are likely to view such applications as tactical. The Chandigarh court’s conclusion that the examination would serve no useful purpose suggests that these thresholds were not met.

At the same time, the court’s reasoning aligns with comparative jurisprudence in Commonwealth jurisdictions. In R v Maxwell [2010] UKSC 48, the UK Supreme Court acknowledged that an abuse of process may arise where the continuation of proceedings would offend the court’s sense of justice and propriety, including through oppressive delay. While that decision focused more on prosecutorial delay, it reflects a broader understanding that the integrity of the process – including its timeliness – is central to criminal justice. Indian courts, through doctrines on speedy trial and misuse of process (for example under Section 482 CrPC), have developed a similar sensitivity.

Opinion & Outlook

The current development in the Chandigarh stalking case signals a firm judicial stance against procedural abuse in high-visibility offences against women. By characterising the application as a delay tactic, the trial court is implicitly affirming that expeditious completion of such trials is a component of justice, not a mere administrative convenience. This approach is in harmony with legislative intent post-2013, where Parliament strengthened both substantive and procedural protections against gender-based violence, and with subsequent judicial exhortations that trials in such matters proceed without avoidable adjournments.

Looking ahead, two trends are likely. First, trial courts may more frequently rely on reasoned orders to refuse late-stage applications for additional evidence or forensic tests that lack clear materiality, especially where there is a demonstrable pattern of non-cooperation or repeated adjournment requests from the accused. Second, appellate courts will be called upon to calibrate these refusals against the accused’s fair-trial rights. Where lower courts clearly articulate that the evidence sought is peripheral or cumulative, higher courts can more confidently uphold such orders; where the trial record shows genuine forensic controversies, intervention may still be warranted.

For cases involving stalking under Section 354D IPC, the jurisprudence is gradually maturing. Early decisions largely focused on definitional questions – what counts as "following" or "contacting" a woman, and how to distinguish criminal stalking from misguided but non-criminal pursuit. More recent decisions, like Mungana Vinayaka, demonstrate a shift toward managing the trial process itself, ensuring that allegations of persistent harassment are not compounded by persistent procedural procrastination. In that sense, the Chandigarh court’s order contributes to an emerging line of authority that balances robust defence rights with a principled insistence on procedural discipline.

Conclusion

The Chandigarh court’s refusal to entertain what it saw as a dilatory request for forensic examination in the 2017 stalking case highlights a broader doctrinal message: the right to a fair trial does not include a right to delay. In offences against women, particularly under Section 354D IPC, courts are increasingly unwilling to tolerate tactics that impede timely adjudication. While each case must turn on its own facts, the trend – reinforced by judgments such as Ranjan Lakhanpal and Mungana Vinayaka – is toward a more assertive judicial management of criminal proceedings, aimed at safeguarding both due process and the constitutional promise of speedy justice.