Judicial Rebellion? Allahabad HC Declares Supreme Court's "Prabir Purkayastha" & "Pankaj Bansal" Judgments Per Incuriam in Habeas Corpus Row

The Hook: A High Court Draws a Line in the Sand Against the Supreme Court

If you have been practicing criminal law over the last two years, you know that the Supreme Court’s rulings in Pankaj Bansal and Prabir Purkayastha have been the golden tickets for defense counsel. The apex court established a rigid, unforgiving rule: if the arresting officer does not provide the grounds of arrest in writing, the arrest violates Article 22(1) of the Constitution, vitiating all subsequent remands and entitling the accused to immediate release.

But what happens when defense lawyers use this constitutional safeguard as a backdoor to bypass trial courts after their regular bail applications fail? In Neeraj v. State of U.P., the Allahabad High Court just dropped a nuclear bomb on this practice. In a breathtaking display of judicial rebellion, a Division Bench has declared the Supreme Court's recent liberty jurisprudence "per incuriam" and hit by stare decisis, opting instead to follow older Constitution Bench verdicts. This is a judgment that every criminal practitioner needs to dissect immediately, because it fundamentally alters how and when you can deploy a Habeas Corpus writ.

The Facts: A Two-Year Slumber Before Waking Up to "Illegal Detention"

The facts are grim but procedurally straightforward. In January 2024, the petitioner, Neeraj, was arrested for the heinous double murder of his wife and one-year-old daughter (under Sections 498A, 304B, 302 IPC).

The criminal machinery moved forward. A chargesheet was filed, the Magistrate took cognizance, the case was committed to the Sessions Court, and charges were framed. By March 2026, the trial was well underway, with prosecution witnesses being cross-examined. Importantly, the petitioner’s regular bail application was rejected by the Sessions Judge in April 2025.

It was only in May 2026—more than two years after his arrest—that the petitioner filed a Habeas Corpus writ before the Allahabad High Court. His sole ground? That at the time of his arrest in 2024, the grounds of arrest were not communicated to him in writing, directly violating the mandate of Prabir Purkayastha and rendering his entire two-year custody illegal.

The Arguments: The Battle of Precedents

The petitioner’s counsel played the only card they had, but it was a heavy one. Relying on a slew of recent Supreme Court blockbusters—Pankaj Bansal, Prabir Purkayastha, Vihaan Kumar, and Mihir Rajesh Shah—they argued that non-compliance with Article 22(1) at the time of arrest is an incurable defect. They contended that if the foundation (the arrest) is void ab initio, the superstructure (subsequent S. 309 CrPC remands by the Sessions Court) must inevitably collapse.

The State, represented by Additional Advocate General Manish Goyal, responded with some of the sharpest appellate advocacy we have seen this year. Instead of merely arguing delay, the AAG went straight for the jurisprudential jugular. He invoked older Supreme Court judgments, including Constitution Benches in Kanu Sanyal (1973), A.K. Gopalan (1966), and Sanjay Dutt (1994). The State’s argument was twofold: First, in Habeas Corpus, the legality of detention is judged on the date of the hearing, not the date of the initial arrest. Second, the recent Supreme Court judgments heavily relied upon by the petitioner failed to consider these older, larger bench decisions, rendering the recent SC rulings per incuriam.

The Judgment: The High Court Rejects the "New Law"

Justice Siddharth, writing for the Division Bench, delivered a remarkably bold judgment. The Court divided the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence into two sets: the "Old Law" (focusing on the validity of custody at the time of the return of the writ) and the "New Law" (focusing on the incurable illegality of the initial arrest).

The High Court held that allowing Habeas Corpus petitions at any stage of the trial—especially after cognizance has been taken and charges framed—would lead to a "chaotic" situation, making a mockery of the entire investigative and trial process. The Court noted that earlier remands under Section 167 CrPC lose their significance once a Magistrate takes cognizance and a valid Section 309 CrPC remand is passed by a Sessions Judge.

Then came the knockout blow. In Paragraph 87, the High Court flatly stated:

"We find respectfully that the second set of judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court [Prabir Purkayastha, Pankaj Bansal, etc.] are not binding precedents and hit by the principles of stare decisis."

The Court dismissed the petition, ruling that once a chargesheet is filed and cognizance is taken, an accused cannot maintain a Habeas Corpus petition challenging the initial arrest. Their only remedy is regular statutory bail.

The Critique: Right Outcome, Dangerously Wrong Reasoning

Let's be clear: the High Court reached the correct practical outcome, but its constitutional reasoning borders on judicial indiscipline.

Where the Petitioner's Counsel Erred: The defense strategy here was a tactical blunder. You cannot sleep on an Article 22(1) violation for two years, participate in the trial, get your regular bail rejected, and then suddenly file a Habeas Corpus petition as a shortcut to liberty. Fundamental rights are not meant to be kept in the back pocket as a trump card to be played when trial cross-examinations aren't going your way. Counsel should have raised the lack of written grounds at the very first remand hearing before the Magistrate.

Where the High Court Erred: While the High Court rightly identified the abuse of process, declaring recent Supreme Court judgments "not binding precedents" is a gross overreach. Under Article 141 of the Constitution, a High Court does not have the luxury of choosing which Supreme Court benches it prefers. The High Court could have easily—and legally—distinguished Pankaj Bansal and Prabir Purkayastha on facts. In those cases, the accused moved the courts immediately during the investigation stage. Here, the trial had commenced. The High Court should have dismissed the petition on the grounds of gross laches and the superseding judicial acts of cognizance and charge-framing, without arrogating to itself the power to declare Supreme Court law per incuriam.

The Takeaway for Practitioners

This judgment serves as a massive wake-up call for criminal defense lawyers across India:

1. Strike While the Iron is Hot: If your client is arrested without written grounds, you must challenge it immediately at the Section 167 remand stage. Do not wait for the chargesheet. Do not wait for committal.

2. Habeas Corpus is Not a Bail Appeal: You cannot use Article 226 as an appellate forum for a rejected regular bail application. Once the judicial machinery of the trial has taken over (cognizance, S. 309 remand), the window for Habeas Corpus effectively slams shut.

3. Watch for the Supreme Court Appeal: Expect this judgment to be challenged in the Supreme Court. The apex court will likely uphold the dismissal of Neeraj's petition due to his egregious delay, but they will almost certainly expunge the Allahabad High Court’s remarks declaring their recent judgments per incuriam. Until then, do not rely on Pankaj Bansal in Uttar Pradesh if your client's chargesheet has already been filed.