Parliament Cannot Amend a Repealed Act and Call It Clarification: AP High Court Gets Section 147A Right
Why This Judgment Matters Let me say this plainly: this is one of the most constitutionally significant tax judgments of 2026 , and it deserves far more attention than it will probably get in mainstream legal reporting. The Andhra Pradesh High Court,...
Why This Judgment Matters
Let me say this plainly: this is one of the most constitutionally significant tax judgments of 2026, and it deserves far more attention than it will probably get in mainstream legal reporting. The Andhra Pradesh High Court, in a batch of over 200 writ petitions, has struck down Section 147A of the Income Tax Act, 1961 — a provision Parliament inserted through the Finance Act, 2026 with retrospective effect from April 1, 2021, in a brazen attempt to nullify adverse High Court judgments that had quashed reassessment notices issued by Jurisdictional Assessing Officers.
The Division Bench of Justice Ninala Jayasurya and Justice T.C.D. Sekhar did not merely strike down the provision on the ground of legislative overreach — a ground that has become almost routine in tax litigation. They went further and identified a more fundamental, almost embarrassingly obvious defect: Parliament amended an Act that had already been repealed. The Income Tax Act, 1961 ceased to exist at midnight on March 31, 2026, replaced by the Income Tax Act, 2025. The Finance Act, 2026, which inserted Section 147A into the 1961 Act, came into force on April 1, 2026 — one day after the 1961 Act died. You cannot amend a corpse.
The Facts: A Pattern of Defiance
The factual background is straightforward but revealing. Following the introduction of Section 151A and the e-Assessment of Income Escaping Assessment Scheme, 2022 (notified on March 29, 2022), reassessment proceedings under Sections 147 and 148 were required to be conducted in a faceless manner through automated allocation. Despite this, Jurisdictional Assessing Officers across Andhra Pradesh — and indeed across the country — continued issuing notices under Sections 148A and 148 as if the scheme did not exist.
When these notices were challenged, a coordinate bench of the AP High Court, by order dated October 28, 2025, quashed them, holding that the JAO lacked jurisdiction in light of Section 151A read with the 2022 scheme. The Revenue filed SLPs before the Supreme Court. While those SLPs were pending, Parliament enacted the Finance Act, 2026, inserting Section 147A with retrospective effect from April 1, 2021. The provision declared, through a non-obstante clause, that the "Assessing Officer" for Sections 148 and 148A would always be deemed to mean an officer other than the NFAC or any assessment unit — in other words, the JAO.
The Supreme Court, by order dated April 10, 2026, set aside the High Court judgments on the limited ground that the foundation of those rulings had been altered by the amendment, and remitted the matters to the respective High Courts for fresh consideration, expressly leaving open the question of Section 147A's constitutional validity. The petitioners amended their writ petitions to challenge the new provision directly.
The Arguments: Overreach vs. Validation
The petitioners' counsel — a veritable army of advocates led by Sri A.V.A. Siva Kartikeya and others — mounted a multi-pronged assault. Their core argument was that Section 147A was not a genuine clarification but a legislative attempt to nullify judicial decisions without removing their basis. They contended that the Legislature cannot sit in appeal over judgments of constitutional courts through the device of retrospective amendment. Critically, they also raised the repeal argument: since the Income Tax Act, 1961 was repealed on March 31, 2026, and the Finance Act, 2026 came into force on April 1, 2026, the insertion of Section 147A into a repealed statute was a legal impossibility.
The Revenue, represented by Additional Solicitor General Sri N. Venkataraman, relied on the well-established doctrine of validating legislation. The argument was that Parliament has plenary power to enact retrospective legislation, that the twin test for validating acts was satisfied — the defect was identified and removed through subsequent enactment — and that the strong presumption of constitutionality applicable to fiscal legislation should carry the day. The Revenue also presented striking statistics: reassessment orders had been passed against 6,46,897 assessees, yielding Rs. 21.74 lakh crores in assessed income, and argued that public interest militated against interference.
The Judgment: Two Independent Grounds for Striking Down
The Bench struck down Section 147A on two independent grounds, each of which would have been sufficient on its own.
First, on legislative overreach: The Court held that the scheme under Section 151A explicitly includes Section 148 within its ambit. The proviso to Section 151A(2) barred any directions after March 31, 2022 — meaning that if the Government intended to exclude Section 148 from faceless proceedings, it had a statutory window to do so, and that window closed. Section 147A was inserted without amending either Section 151A or the scheme framed under it. Relying on Shri Prithvi Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Broach Borough Municipality, (1969) 2 SCC 283, and State of Tamil Nadu v. M. Rayappaiah Gounder, (1971) 3 SCC 1, the Court held that while the Legislature can remove the basis of a judicial decision, it cannot simply nullify the decision without removing the defect. Here, no defect in the scheme was ever identified by any court — the courts had merely held that the scheme, as it stood, required faceless proceedings. Without amending the scheme, Section 147A was an impermissible legislative overruling.
Second, on the repeal point: This is where the judgment becomes truly interesting. The Court applied Section 5 of the General Clauses Act and the Supreme Court's ruling in Common Cause v. Union of India, (2003) 8 SCC 250, to hold that when an enactment expressly provides for its commencement date, it comes into force on that date — not on the date of Presidential assent. The Finance Act, 2026 expressly provided for commencement on April 1, 2026. By that date, the Income Tax Act, 1961 had already been repealed. Therefore, the insertion of Section 147A into the 1961 Act was legally unsustainable from inception.
"Any amendment/insertion made to the Repealed Act is not sustainable under law and it has no legal sanctity, accordingly the same is liable to be struck down from the date of its inception or nativity."
The Critique: Right Result, but the Repeal Argument Deserves Scrutiny
I agree with the outcome, but I want to examine the repeal reasoning carefully because it is the more vulnerable of the two grounds.
The Court's logic is technically sound: the Finance Act, 2026 said it comes into force on April 1, 2026; the 1961 Act was repealed at midnight on March 31, 2026; therefore, the amendment targets a repealed statute. But the Revenue's counter — that Presidential assent was given on March 30, 2026, when the 1961 Act was very much alive — deserved more than a summary dismissal. The Court relied on Common Cause to hold that the express commencement date overrides the assent date. That is correct as far as it goes. But there is a legitimate question about whether the "deemed insertion" language in Section 9 of the Finance Act — "shall be deemed to have been inserted with effect from the 1st day of April, 2021" — creates a legal fiction that operates independently of the commencement date. The Court did not engage with this nuance.
That said, the petitioners' argument on Section 536 of the Income Tax Act, 2025 was persuasive. Section 536(2)(c) provides that the repealed Act continues to apply to pending proceedings "as per the procedure specified in the repealed Income Tax Act" — meaning the 1961 Act as it actually stood, not as Parliament wished it had stood. Section 536(2)(u) preserves schemes notified under the repealed Act. If the scheme survives, and the scheme requires faceless proceedings, then the saving clause itself defeats Section 147A.
On the overreach ground, the judgment is unassailable. The Court correctly identified that the Legislature's failure to amend the scheme under Section 151A was fatal. You cannot override a judicial interpretation of a scheme by amending the parent Act while leaving the scheme untouched. The scheme is the operative instrument; the courts interpreted the scheme; the Legislature amended the Act. This is like trying to change the rules of a game by rewriting the rulebook's introduction while leaving the actual rules intact.
The Revenue's public interest argument — Rs. 21.74 lakh crores in assessed income — was given short shrift, and rightly so. Constitutional validity does not bend to fiscal convenience. If it did, every unconstitutional tax measure would survive on the ground that too much money is at stake.
The Takeaway for Practitioners
Three practical lessons emerge. First, always check the repeal and savings provisions when dealing with transitional tax legislation. The interaction between the Income Tax Act, 2025 and the repealed 1961 Act is fertile ground for jurisdictional challenges, and this judgment demonstrates that courts will take these arguments seriously.
Second, the scheme is the battlefield, not the parent Act. When challenging faceless assessment proceedings, focus on the text of the scheme and whether it has been amended. An amendment to the parent Act that leaves the scheme untouched is vulnerable to exactly the kind of challenge that succeeded here.
Third, the Supreme Court's stay of the Punjab and Haryana High Court's similar ruling (order dated September 18, 2026 in SLP (Civil) No. 33196 of 2026) means this issue is headed for a definitive Supreme Court resolution. The AP High Court noted the stay but decided independently. Practitioners should advise clients that while this judgment provides immediate relief in Andhra Pradesh, the constitutional question remains open at the national level. Expect the Revenue to file SLPs against this judgment promptly, and expect the Supreme Court to club all these matters together.
The broader trend is unmistakable: Parliament's increasing use of retrospective amendments to overturn adverse judicial decisions in tax matters is meeting sustained judicial resistance. From Vodafone to the faceless assessment litigation, courts are drawing a line between legitimate legislative clarification and impermissible judicial overruling. This judgment draws that line firmly — and, in the repeal argument, finds a new and creative basis for holding it.
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