Privilege, Procedure and Power: Kejriwal–Sisodia in Delhi HC

Introduction

On 10 November 2025 Arvind Kejriwal and Manish Sisodia petitioned the Delhi High Court challenging summons issued by the Delhi Assembly’s Privileges Committee over their alleged role in inaugurating a so‑called “faansi ghar”. The writ alleges that the Committee’s summons exceed its jurisdiction, breach rules of natural justice and are tainted by mala fides. Though politically charged, the dispute raises core questions of constitutional law: the scope and limits of legislative privilege under Article 194, the standard of judicial review applicable to internal legislative proceedings, and the procedural protections owed to persons summoned by parliamentary committees. The High Court’s approach will be consequential for separation of powers, parliamentary autonomy and the protection of individual rights.

Legal background

Legislative privilege in India is rooted in Articles 105 and 194 of the Constitution and in long‑standing common law principles. State legislatures possess certain privileges to regulate internal proceedings, summon witnesses and punish contempt; however, privilege is not absolute. The Supreme Court in Ajit Mohan v Legislative Assembly (AIR 2021 SC 3346) clarified that while courts should respect legislative autonomy, they may judicially review privilege committee actions where there is jurisdictional excess, denial of natural justice, or mala fide exercise of power. The Court emphasized a limited, deferential inquiry: courts will not substitute their view on the merits of privilege but will act to prevent arbitrary or ultra vires actions.

Earlier decisions such as Maneka Gandhi v Union of India (1978) establish that procedural fairness is a constitutional requirement where state action impacts fundamental rights; jurisprudence since S.P. Gupta and subsequent High Court authorities (for example Rajesh Tyagi & Ors v Jaibir Singh & Ors, Delhi HC 2021) reflect similar themes. These authorities together frame the test: a privileges committee’s process must disclose statutory/constitutional competence, provide adequate particulars and opportunity to be heard, and be free from evident prejudice.

Critical analysis

The core legal questions are jurisdiction, procedural fairness, and proportionality. Jurisdictionally, the Committee must demonstrate that the inauguration constitutes contempt of the Assembly, obstructs its function or otherwise falls within the constitutional ambit of privilege. Privilege traditionally covers acts that undermine the dignity or function of the legislature or amount to contempt in relation to its proceedings. A mere public ceremony—however provocative—may not automatically engage privilege unless it can be shown to have a direct and substantial link to legislative functioning. If the Committee’s notice fails to articulate that link, the summons may be vulnerable to challenge as ultra vires.

Procedural fairness is likely to be the decisive issue at the interlocutory stage. Ajit Mohan instructs courts to police denial of natural justice: persons summoned must receive clear particulars of the alleged breach, adequate time to prepare, and a fair opportunity to present evidence or be represented. If the Committee’s communication to Kejriwal and Sisodia is vague, omits decisive facts, or precludes meaningful defence, the High Court can require the Committee to remedy defects or stay proceedings. Practical judicial relief frequently takes the form of directions: furnish detailed grounds, provide time and access to evidence, and allow legal representation. Maneka Gandhi’s insistence on procedural due process supports such remedial directions.

Proportionality and fundamental rights interplay: even if jurisdiction exists, the Committee’s procedures must be proportionate to the aim of protecting legislative dignity. An investigation that operates as a tool for political harassment or that imposes unreasonable restrictions on free speech would attract judicial scrutiny. The Court will weigh institutional comity against the individual’s constitutional protections under Articles 19 and 21.

Conversely, the Assembly will press institutional autonomy: routine judicial intervention risks eroding legislative independence and creating tactical litigation. Ajit Mohan’s framework counsels restraint — courts should not micro‑manage legitimate internal processes. If the Committee’s record shows particularised allegations and fair process, the High Court may decline further interference.

Opinion & outlook

Given recent precedent, the Delhi High Court is likely to pursue a narrow, supervisory role: ensuring procedure, not pronouncing on substantive guilt. Expect interlocutory directions requiring the Committee to provide detailed grounds for the summons, disclose the evidence upon which it relies, and afford the petitioners a meaningful hearing with legal representation. If these safeguards are supplied, courts will probably refrain from further intervention in deference to legislative autonomy.

However, the case underlines the absence of uniform procedural safeguards for privilege inquiries. A predictable remedy lies in legislative reform: enactment of minimum procedural standards for privileges committees—clear notice requirements, time limits, rights to legal representation, rules on evidence and a mechanism for internal review—would reconcile institutional independence with constitutional fairness. Until then, courts will remain the gatekeeper, stepped in where process is defective and abstaining where it is not.

Conclusion

The Kejriwal–Sisodia petition tests the constitutional balance between legislative privilege and judicial protection of fundamental rights. While privilege secures legislative functioning, it cannot be wielded arbitrarily. The Delhi High Court’s likely course—demanding procedural particularity and fair hearing—would reaffirm Ajit Mohan’s principle: judicial review is limited, but it exists to prevent jurisdictional excess and denial of natural justice, preserving the rule of law within the precincts of legislative autonomy.