SCOTUS Slams the Door on Compassionate Release for Sentencing Law Changes

The Supreme Court delivered a significant blow to federal criminal defense practitioners on May 28, 2026, ruling 6-3 that judges cannot grant compassionate release merely because a defendant would receive a shorter sentence under current law following the First Step Act. The decision, arising from two consolidated Pennsylvania armed-robbery cases, represents a sharp limitation on how courts may use the compassionate-release mechanism and effectively forecloses a major avenue of relief that defense counsel had been pursuing since the Sentencing Commission expanded eligibility criteria in 2023.

The Ruling and Its Immediate Impact

In rejecting the prisoners' arguments, the Court held that changes in sentencing law—specifically, the reality that the defendants would likely receive substantially shorter sentences if sentenced today—do not constitute "extraordinary and compelling reasons" for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). The ruling upholds lower-court denials for the two Pennsylvania inmates and, critically, invalidates a 2023 U.S. Sentencing Commission policy adopted under the Biden administration that had broadened the categories of circumstances qualifying for release.

The Court went further in a companion case decided the same day, holding that federal prisoners cannot use the First Step Act's compassionate-release mechanism to attack the validity of their underlying convictions. This closes off what some defense attorneys had hoped might become a backdoor method for raising innocence claims or legal errors that were procedurally barred under traditional habeas corpus rules.

Why This Matters for Federal Criminal Practice

The practical implications are immediate and severe for the defense bar. Since the First Step Act's passage in 2018, compassionate release had evolved from a rarely used mechanism into a meaningful tool for addressing sentencing disparities, particularly for defendants who received draconian mandatory minimums under the old crack cocaine laws or stacked 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) firearm charges. The 2023 Sentencing Commission amendments had explicitly authorized courts to consider "changes in the law" as extraordinary and compelling reasons, leading to a wave of successful motions.

That avenue is now closed. Defense counsel must pivot to individualized factors—terminal illness, advanced age, family circumstances, or extraordinary rehabilitation—rather than arguing that non-retroactive sentencing reforms justify release. This distinction matters enormously because it shifts the focus from systemic injustice to personal circumstance, making compassionate release a much harder sell for inmates whose primary claim is that they were sentenced under a since-reformed legal regime.

The ruling also reinforces the non-retroactivity of the First Step Act's sentencing reforms. While Congress made certain provisions retroactive (notably the Fair Sentencing Act's crack/powder disparity fixes), it left others prospective only. The Supreme Court has now made clear that courts cannot use compassionate release as an end-run around that congressional choice.

AEDPA and the Broader Retrenchment

This decision fits within a broader pattern of the Court limiting post-conviction relief mechanisms. Just weeks later, on June 22, 2026, the Court reinstated the 2017 murder conviction of Pedro Hernandez in the Etan Patz case, holding that the Second Circuit had exceeded its authority under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). Together, these rulings signal a Court deeply skeptical of judicial efforts to revisit final criminal judgments, whether through compassionate release or federal habeas corpus.

For practitioners, the message is clear: the window for creative post-conviction advocacy is narrowing. Motions must be grounded in the specific statutory criteria and supported by robust factual records of individual hardship, not legal arguments about changing sentencing norms.