Section 69 BNS Under the Microscope: High Courts Draw the Line on "Deceit" in False Promise to Marry Cases

Indian criminal practice is currently in the crucible. The transition from the IPC and CrPC to the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) and Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS) is no longer a matter of academic debate—it is playing out daily in trial courts and High Courts. Unsurprisingly, the most ferocious early battles are centered around one of the most controversial additions to our penal code: Section 69 of the BNS.

For decades, the Indian legal system grappled with cases where sexual relations were established under a false promise of marriage. Under the old regime, prosecutors had to force-fit these facts into Section 375 (Rape) read with Section 90 (Consent under misconception of fact) of the IPC. The Supreme Court, through landmark precedents like Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra, repeatedly had to distinguish between a "false promise" (which vitiates consent) and a mere "breach of promise" (which does not).

The legislature attempted to resolve this by introducing Section 69 BNS, which expressly criminalizes sexual intercourse by "deceitful means" (including false promise of marriage) as a distinct offense punishable by up to 10 years, explicitly separating it from the offense of rape (Section 63 BNS). But as recent rulings from the Allahabad and Delhi High Courts show, statutory codification has not entirely cured the judicial anxiety surrounding these cases.

The Delhi vs. Allahabad Dichotomy: What Constitutes "Deceit"?

Two distinct judicial approaches have emerged in early 2026 regarding the threshold for quashing Section 69 FIRs.

In Kuldeep Verma v. State of U.P. (January 13, 2026), the Allahabad High Court took a stringent but balanced view. The Court ruled that proceedings under Section 69 cannot be quashed at the threshold if the FIR allegations prima facie demonstrate a dishonest intent from the very inception of the relationship. However, the Court crucially clarified a lifeline for the defense: mere relationship breakdown without initial dishonest intent does not invoke criminal liability, allowing for pre-trial quashing under Section 528 of the BNSS (the equivalent of the old Section 482 CrPC) in appropriate cases.

Contrast this with a highly consequential ruling from the Delhi High Court on February 24, 2026. The Court held that refusing marriage due to a "kundli mismatch" after establishing physical relations on repeated assurances squarely attracts Section 69 BNS. The Delhi High Court effectively ruled that using an astrological incompatibility as an ex post facto justification for abandoning a partner is indicative of deceit.

Why This Matters for Practicing Lawyers

If you are a defense counsel or a prosecutor, these judgments fundamentally alter how you must draft your pleadings.

For the Prosecution: You can no longer rely on a vague assertion that the accused "promised to marry and then backed out." To survive a quashing petition, your FIR and Section 183 BNSS (formerly 164 CrPC) statements must meticulously establish the mens rea at the inception. You must plead facts showing that the accused never had the intention to marry the victim at the moment the promise was made. The Delhi HC judgment gives you a powerful weapon: sudden, culturally convenient excuses (like kundli mismatches or sudden parental opposition) can be framed as evidence of initial deceit.

For the Defense: Your strategy must pivot toward proving a "genuine relationship." Section 69 BNS uses the phrase "deceitful means." Therefore, documenting the history of the relationship is paramount. WhatsApp chats showing shared financial planning, evidence of involving family members, or mutual efforts to arrange a marriage will be critical to proving that the intent to marry was genuine initially, but circumstances later rendered it impossible. If you can establish this, the Allahabad HC's logic in Kuldeep Verma paves the way for a successful quashing petition.

The Broader Trend: Courts Reining in the Sanhitas

The judicial scrutiny of the new laws isn't limited to Section 69 BNS. Across the board, constitutional courts are aggressively policing the BNSS to ensure it doesn't dilute established Article 21 jurisprudence.

"The legislature may change the statute, but the constitutional baseline remains unmoved."

A prime example is the Supreme Court's pushback against the expanded police powers in the BNSS. In 2025’s Vihaan Kumar case, the Supreme Court severely curtailed the application of Section 43(3) BNSS, which explicitly authorized handcuffing for certain categories of accused. The Court ruled that routine handcuffing still violates Articles 21 and 22, mandating recorded justification and strict judicial oversight, effectively rendering the draconian statutory provision subordinate to the principles laid down decades ago in Prem Shankar Shukla.

Similarly, the Supreme Court is using the new provisions to force systemic reform, as seen in its November 2025 and early 2026 directives enforcing Section 479 BNSS. The Court has directed jail superintendents to proactively identify and release undertrial women prisoners who have served their maximum detention periods, shifting the burden of bail from the impoverished accused to the State machinery.

The Takeaway

For law students and junior practitioners, the lesson from the first wave of BNS/BNSS litigation is clear: the new Sanhitas have not erased the old jurisprudence; they have merely provided a new canvas for it. Whether you are arguing the nuances of "deceit" under Section 69 BNS or fighting against arbitrary handcuffing under Section 43(3) BNSS, your strongest arguments will still be anchored in the constitutional safeguards developed over the last seventy years. Update your section numbers, but keep your old case law close at hand.