Stop Shirking Jurisdiction: Kerala HC Reminds Administrative Tribunals They Are Courts of First Instance for Constitutional Challenges

The Hook: A Case of Judicial Amnesia at the Tribunal

There is a troubling trend among statutory tribunals in India: a palpable reluctance to entertain constitutional challenges, often masked as a strict adherence to "jurisdictional limits." We see this time and again when complex questions regarding the vires of subordinate legislation are raised. The tribunals, perhaps eager to clear their dockets of standard service disputes, simply wash their hands of the matter and point the litigants toward the High Court.

The Kerala High Court’s recent judgment in Dr. Fathimath Naseeha M.F v. State of Kerala (2026:KER:6528) is a sharp, necessary rebuke to this exact brand of judicial abdication. Decided on January 27, 2026, by a Division Bench comprising Justices Anil K. Narendran and Muralee Krishna S., the judgment serves as a harsh reminder to the Kerala Administrative Tribunal (KAT) of an embarrassingly elementary principle of constitutional law settled almost three decades ago in L. Chandra Kumar.

For practitioners navigating service law, this case is a vital refresher on forum selection and a stark warning about the time and cost wasted when tribunals refuse to do their jobs.

The Facts: Stripped to the Essentials

The factual matrix is straightforward. Twelve doctors possessing a Postgraduate Diploma in Netra Roga Vigyan (Ayurveda Ophthalmology) sought appointment to the post of Medical Officer (Netra) in the Kerala Department of Indian Systems of Medicine.

On December 30, 2024, the Kerala Public Service Commission (KPSC) issued a notification for the post. However, the applicants hit a statutory wall: the Indian Systems of Medicine (Kerala) Service Amendment Special Rules, 2020, did not recognize their PG Diploma as a valid alternative qualification to an MD/MS degree.

Consequently, the doctors approached the Kerala Administrative Tribunal (KAT) under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. They did not just challenge the KPSC notification; they specifically sought a declaration that the non-inclusion of their qualification in the 2020 Special Rules was arbitrary, discriminatory, and unconstitutional.

In July 2025, the KAT dismissed their application at the threshold. The Tribunal’s reasoning? It claimed that fixing qualifications was a State policy decision, and mere "aspirants" to a post lacked the locus standi to challenge the wisdom of the Government. Crucially, the KAT held that it lacked the jurisdiction under Section 15(1)(a) of the Act to adjudicate upon the constitutional validity of Special Rules, suggesting the applicants try their luck in the High Court as a pro bono publico.

The Arguments: A Rare Consensus

Aggrieved by this summary dismissal, the doctors filed an Original Petition before the Kerala High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution.

Advocate T.C. Govindaswamy, representing the petitioners, argued that the KAT’s refusal to entertain the application was patently illegal and arbitrary. He rightly pointed out that testing the validity of recruitment rules falls squarely within the Tribunal's mandate.

In a rare and amusing turn of events, the respondents effectively threw in the towel on defending the KAT's logic. The Standing Counsel for the KPSC candidly submitted that the Tribunal’s reasoning could not be sustained in light of recent High Court precedents, specifically Sadhiq M.M. v. State of Kerala [2025 (1) KHC 402]. When even the opposing counsel admits the lower forum’s legal logic is fundamentally flawed, you know the Tribunal has severely misdirected itself.

The Judgment: Dusting off L. Chandra Kumar

The Division Bench wasted no time in dismantling the KAT’s order. Justice Anil K. Narendran, authoring the judgment, rooted the Court's reasoning entirely in the bedrock of Indian tribunal jurisprudence: the seven-judge Constitution Bench decision in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India [(1997) 3 SCC 261].

The High Court reiterated the core ratio of L. Chandra Kumar:

"The Tribunals created under Article 323A and Article 323B of the Constitution are possessed of the competence to test the constitutional validity of statutory provisions and rules... The Tribunals will, nevertheless, continue to act like courts of first instance in respect of the areas of law for which they have been constituted."

The High Court clarified the only exception to this rule: a Tribunal cannot entertain a challenge against the vires of its own parent statute (i.e., the Administrative Tribunals Act). Because the Tribunal is a creature of that statute, it cannot declare its creator unconstitutional. For everything else—including subordinate legislation like the Special Rules governing recruitment—the Tribunal is the mandatory court of first instance.

The Bench noted that litigants cannot bypass the Tribunal and directly approach the High Court under Article 226 for service matters, even when constitutional questions are raised. Because the doctors correctly approached the KAT first, the KAT’s refusal to hear them was "patently illegal."

The High Court set aside the KAT’s order and remanded the matter back to the Tribunal for a decision on the merits.

The Critique: A Docket-Clearing Exercise Gone Wrong

Let’s call the KAT’s original order what it was: a lazy, docket-clearing exercise masquerading as judicial restraint. Paragraphs 5 through 9 of the KAT’s order are deeply frustrating to read.

First, the KAT’s assertion that mere "aspirants" do not have locus standi to challenge the constitutionality of Special Rules is baffling. If a candidate is arbitrarily excluded from public employment due to an allegedly unconstitutional rule, they are the primary aggrieved party. Suggesting they must file a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) in the High Court fundamentally misunderstands both service jurisprudence and Article 16 of the Constitution.

Second, the failure of the Tribunal to apply L. Chandra Kumar is inexcusable. This isn’t an obscure, newly minted Supreme Court judgment; it is the 1997 magna carta of Administrative Tribunals in India. Every Tribunal member should know it by heart. For a Tribunal in 2025 to claim it lacks jurisdiction to test the constitutional validity of a recruitment rule shows a shocking disconnect from settled law.

While I completely agree with the High Court’s judgment, the Bench was perhaps too polite. When a statutory tribunal forces litigants to spend time and money litigating a writ petition just to confirm a basic jurisdictional fact settled 29 years ago, the High Court ought to pass strictures. The advocates for the petitioners missed an opportunity to press for exemplary costs against the State, or at least seek a time-bound direction for the KAT to dispose of the remanded matter.

The Takeaway for Practitioners

For lawyers practicing in service and constitutional law, Dr. Fathimath Naseeha offers three critical takeaways:

1. Never Bypass the Tribunal: If you are challenging the constitutional validity of a service rule, a government order, or a notification, do not file a direct writ petition in the High Court. The High Court will dismiss it citing alternative remedy. You must go to the Administrative Tribunal first.
2. Nip Tribunal Reluctance in the Bud: If you sense the Tribunal trying to dodge a complex constitutional question by citing "lack of jurisdiction," immediately cite paragraph 93 of L. Chandra Kumar. Remind them aggressively that they are the court of first instance for constitutional challenges to subordinate legislation.
3. The Parent Act Exception: Remember the one blind spot. If your case requires challenging the constitutionality of the Administrative Tribunals Act itself, you cannot go to the KAT or CAT. That is the only scenario where a direct Article 226 petition to the High Court is maintainable in a service matter.

Ultimately, this judgment is a win for procedural correctness, but it is a pyrrhic victory for the petitioners who lost a year of their lives just fighting for the right to be heard. Let us hope the KAT takes this reprimand seriously and stops kicking the constitutional can down the road.