The "Anti-Collision" Magic Trick: How a Boilerplate Clause Saved Gujarat's Pipeline Law

1. The Hook: The Illusion of Concurrent Harmony

In the relentless push for infrastructure development, the friction between Central and State legislation is a tale as old as our Constitution. But what happens when a State enacts a law that is a near-carbon copy of a Central statute? According to the Gujarat High Court’s recent decision in Champaklal Naranji Patel v. State of Gujarat (2026), as long as both statutes contain a boilerplate "in addition to and not in derogation of" clause, there is no constitutional repugnancy. They simply co-exist.

For practitioners advising infrastructure giants or land-owners, this judgment is a fascinating—and highly debatable—masterclass in constitutional pragmatism. The Court essentially allowed a statutory savings clause to bypass the rigorous repugnancy test of Article 254. It is a pragmatic win for state infrastructure projects, but doctrinally, it leaves behind a messy precedent that lawyers will be untangling for years.

2. The Facts: Stripped to the Essentials

The factual matrix is straightforward. The petitioner, Champaklal Patel, purchased a parcel of agricultural land in Surat in July 2008. Barely a month later, the Gujarat State Petronet Limited (GSPL) issued a notification under Section 3 of the Gujarat Water & Gas Pipelines (Acquisition of Right of User in Land) Act, 2000 ("the State Act"), declaring its intention to acquire a "right of user" to lay a natural gas pipeline.

By April 2009, a Section 6 notification was issued, formally acquiring the right. The petitioner challenged the entire acquisition, arguing that the State lacked the legislative competence to enact the State Act, and even if it did, the law was hopelessly repugnant to the Parliament's Petroleum and Minerals Pipelines (Acquisition of Right of User in Land) Act, 1962 ("the Central Act").

3. The Arguments: Barking Up the Wrong Constitutional Tree

The petitioner’s advocates launched a two-pronged attack, but unfortunately, they spent too much ammunition on a losing battle.

First, they argued that natural gas falls exclusively under Entry 53 of List I (Union List). Therefore, any law facilitating the transmission of gas—even through acquiring land—is beyond the State's competence. Second, they argued that even if the law falls under Entry 42 of List III (Concurrent List - Acquisition of Property), it is repugnant to the Central Act of 1962. They contended that the Presidential Assent obtained for the State Act was defective because the specific conflict with the Central Act was never pointed out to the President.

The Advocate General for the State and Senior Counsel for GSPL countered with a much sharper strategy. They relied heavily on the Supreme Court’s ruling in Laljibhai Kadvabhai Savaliya v. State of Gujarat (2016) 9 SCC 791, which recognized the Central Act as a pure land acquisition law referable to Entry 42 of List III. More importantly, they pointed to Section 18 of both the Central and State Acts, which state that the provisions are "in addition to and not in derogation of" any other law. They argued this was an inbuilt "anti-collision mechanism."

4. The Judgment: Pragmatism Over Strict Doctrine

The Division Bench, comprising Chief Justice Sunita Agarwal and Justice D.N. Ray, dismissed the writ petitions. The Court's reasoning rested on three primary pillars:

• Legislative Competence: The Court rightly held that the "pith and substance" of the State Act is the acquisition of a right of user in land, which squarely falls under Entry 42 of List III, not Entry 53 of List I.
• The "Anti-Collision" Clause: Relying on cases like M. Karunanidhi v. Union of India (1979) 3 SCC 431, the Court held that the phrase "in addition to and not in derogation of" in Section 18 of the Central Act explicitly proves Parliament did not intend to occupy the entire field. The State Legislature echoed this in its own Section 18.
• Pari Materia = No Repugnancy: In a rather startling conclusion, the Court compared the two Acts, found them to be heavily identical (pari materia), and concluded that because they are identical, they are not inconsistent. Thus, Article 254 repugnancy is not attracted.

"Comparing the provisions of the Central Act, 1962 and the State Act, 2000... we find no inconsistency in any provision between the two. Therefore, there can be no repugnancy... within the meaning of Article 254 of the Constitution of India."

5. The Critique: A Doctrinal Sleight of Hand

While the outcome makes practical sense—halting major gas pipelines over a turf war serves no one—the Court's reasoning on Article 254 is flawed and sets a dangerous precedent.

First, the petitioners made a tactical error by pushing the Entry 53 (Union List) argument. After the Supreme Court's decision in Laljibhai, arguing that acquiring land for pipelines is a Union subject was a dead end. The advocates should have conceded Entry 42 of List III and focused exclusively on the mechanics of operational repugnancy.

Here is where the Court's reasoning falters: The judges concluded that because the State Act and Central Act are identical (pari materia), there is no repugnancy. This turns decades of constitutional jurisprudence on its head. As laid down in the classic tests of repugnancy, if a State enacts a law that is identical to a Central law on a Concurrent List subject, it is precisely because they occupy the exact same field that the State law is repugnant, unless saved by Presidential Assent under Article 254(2). You cannot have two parallel, identical statutory regimes operated by different authorities for the exact same purpose without creating a direct collision in implementation.

Furthermore, elevating a statutory boilerplate clause—"in addition to and not in derogation of"—to the status of a constitutional shield is highly questionable. Can a statute contract out of Article 254? If Parliament enacts a law, it is the supreme law of the land in that field. A savings clause is meant to protect other distinct remedies (e.g., Consumer Protection Act remedies existing alongside civil suits). It is not meant to allow States to create a parallel, identical sovereign acquisition regime to bypass the Central machinery.

The Court effectively used Section 18 as a magic wand to wave away the constitutional requirement of proving that the President applied his mind to the specific conflict between the two statutes.

6. The Takeaway: What Practitioners Should Learn

For lawyers practicing in the infrastructure, energy, and land acquisition space, this judgment offers critical tactical lessons:

1. Stop Flogging Dead Horses: If the Supreme Court has characterized a statute’s "pith and substance" (like the 1962 Act in Laljibhai), do not attempt to re-litigate the legislative entry. Move straight to the operational conflicts.

2. The Power of Savings Clauses: When challenging a state law on grounds of repugnancy, immediately check for "in addition to and not in derogation of" clauses in both the Central and State statutes. You must be prepared to argue why such clauses do not override the constitutional test of "occupied field." If you are defending the State, this judgment is your new best friend.

3. The Parallel Universe of Infra Laws: We are entering an era where States, frustrated by Central bureaucratic delays, will increasingly enact their own parallel infrastructure acquisition laws. As long as courts are willing to look the other way using "anti-collision" logic, clients must be advised that they could be subjected to either regime depending on which authority knocks on their door first.

The Gujarat High Court has taken a pragmatic route to ensure the state's pipelines keep flowing. But doctrinally, by holding that identical statutes cannot be repugnant, the Bench has left a gaping hole in Article 254 jurisprudence—one that is ripe for a challenge before the Supreme Court.