The Compassionate Release Clampdown: SCOTUS Narrows First Step Act’s Safety Valve

In a decisive 6-3 ruling that will immediately alter sentencing advocacy nationwide, the Supreme Court held on May 28 that federal judges may not grant compassionate release under the First Step Act based solely on the fact that a defendant would receive a shorter sentence if sentenced today. The decision forecloses what had become an increasingly common workaround for the harsh realities of the Apprendi era’s sentencing disparities—particularly for defendants sentenced under pre-Booker mandatory guidelines or outdated crack cocaine ratios.

The End of the "Today’s Sentence" Argument

The Court’s holding directly targets the practice of using 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) to circumvent the Sentencing Guidelines’ current structure. Defense attorneys had successfully argued in several circuits that the "extraordinary and compelling reasons" required for compassionate release could be satisfied by demonstrating that changes in law—such as the First Step Act’s own reduction of certain mandatory minimums—meant the defendant would receive a materially shorter sentence if sentenced under today’s regime.

Writing for the majority, the Court rejected this logic, emphasizing that compassionate release is not a "second look" mechanism designed to retroactively apply legislative leniency. The opinion effectively cabins § 3582(c)(1)(A) to its traditional domains: terminal illness, debilitation, and family circumstances, plus other reasons specifically recognized by the Sentencing Commission. The ruling also bars prisoners from using compassionate release motions to attack uncertainty about the validity of their underlying convictions—a strategy that had gained traction in cases involving potentially unconstitutional Johnson-era career offender enhancements.

"The First Step Act’s compassionate release provision is a narrow safety valve, not a general resentencing mechanism for courts to recalibrate sentences based on evolving views of penal policy."

Practical Impact: What Changes Monday Morning

For federal practitioners, the calculus of compassionate release motions just became significantly more constrained. The most immediate effect will be felt in the circuit courts that had embraced the "changes in law" theory—most notably the First, Fourth, and Tenth Circuits—where dozens of pending motions now face certain denial. Defense counsel must pivot to emphasizing individualized medical or family circumstances rather than systemic sentencing disparities.

Moreover, the ruling creates a stark bifurcation between defendants sentenced before and after the First Step Act’s enactment. While the Act reduced mandatory minimums for certain drug offenses prospectively, the Court has now made clear that those reductions cannot serve as the sole basis for reducing existing sentences. This creates a perverse incentive structure: defendants who pleaded guilty before the Act’s passage may serve longer sentences than identically situated defendants who waited to plead, with no judicial remedy available.

Prosecutors, meanwhile, gain significant leverage. The Department of Justice had vigorously opposed the "changes in law" theory, arguing it would flood the courts with meritless motions. The ruling effectively ends that flood, but it also removes judicial discretion to correct what many judges viewed as unjust sentencing disparities. Expect U.S. Attorney’s Offices to oppose compassionate release motions more aggressively, knowing that the "today’s sentence" argument is now off the table.

The Unresolved Tension with Section 3553(a)

The decision leaves unresolved the tension between § 3582(c)(1)(A) and the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Many district courts had reasoned that if a sentence would be "greater than necessary" under today’s § 3553(a) analysis, that constituted an extraordinary and compelling reason for release. The Court’s rejection of this logic suggests that § 3553(a) factors are largely irrelevant to the compassionate release calculus—a position that sits uneasily with the statute’s directive that courts consider those factors when determining whether a reduction is warranted.

Look for immediate legislative pushback. Criminal justice reform advocates, who viewed compassionate release as a critical tool for addressing mass incarceration, will likely press Congress to amend § 3582(c)(1)(A) to explicitly authorize consideration of changes in law. Until then, the First Step Act’s promise of retroactive leniency remains largely unfulfilled for the thousands of federal prisoners who had pinned their hopes on judicial mercy.