The Constitutional Pothole: Supreme Court Elevates the "Right to Walk" to Part III, But Can Writs Fix Civic Apathy?

The Hyper-Expansion of Part III in 2026

If you have been monitoring the Supreme Court’s constitutional jurisprudence in the first half of 2026, a distinct and somewhat alarming trend has emerged. The Apex Court has embarked on an aggressive expansion of Part III of the Constitution, reading highly specific civic and administrative entitlements directly into our fundamental rights. The most striking of these is the Court’s declaration that the right to walk on safe and well-demarcated footpaths is a fundamental right, specifically locating it within the "primary right of movement" under Article 19(1)(d).

Coupled with another recent 2026 ruling recognizing road safety as a fundamental right under Article 21, and a reaffirmation of the State's affirmative duty to provide a clean environment, the Supreme Court is sending a clear message: the failure of municipal governance is no longer just an administrative lapse; it is a constitutional violation.

From Ratlam Municipality to Article 19(1)(d)

To understand the magnitude of this shift, we must look at how municipal accountability has historically been litigated in India. For decades, the gold standard was Justice Krishna Iyer’s landmark ruling in Municipal Council, Ratlam v. Vardhichand (1980), which weaponized Section 133 of the CrPC to force civic bodies to do their jobs. Back then, the Court used statutory public nuisance provisions to compel municipal action.

Later, the battle over footpaths was defined by Olga Tellis (1985) and Bombay Hawkers' Union (1985), where the tension was between the pavement dweller’s right to livelihood (Article 21) and the pedestrian’s right of way. The rhetoric was balanced, often leaning towards the socio-economic realities of the urban poor.

Fast forward to 2026. The Supreme Court has unequivocally tilted the scales. By elevating the physical act of walking on a safe footpath to an Article 19(1)(d) guarantee, the Court has essentially ruled that encroached, broken, or non-existent sidewalks are an infringement on the freedom of movement.

"The freedom to move freely throughout the territory of India under Article 19(1)(d) is illusory if the very infrastructure required for basic human mobility—safe, demarcated pedestrian walkways—is denied by state apathy."

What This Means for the Practicing Lawyer

For litigators, this jurisprudential leap is a tactical goldmine. Here is how this changes practice on the ground:

1. Bypassing the Civil Courts: Historically, if a citizen was injured due to an open manhole or a poorly designed intersection, the remedy was a tortious claim for negligence against the municipal corporation (BMC, BBMP, MCD, etc.). We all know that prosecuting a civil suit against a municipal body in India is a multi-decade exercise in futility. With the "Right to Walk" and "Road Safety" now entrenched in Part III, lawyers can bypass the civil courts entirely. Injuries or deaths caused by civic negligence are now ripe for Article 226 writ petitions seeking constitutional tort damages, relying on the Nilabati Behera standard.

2. A New Weapon for PILs: Public Interest Litigations seeking the removal of encroachments, illegal parking, or hawkers from footpaths just got a massive constitutional upgrade. You are no longer arguing mere violation of municipal zoning laws; you are arguing a direct violation of Article 19(1)(d). Municipal commissioners will find it exceedingly difficult to defend encroachment regularizations when faced with a fundamental right.

3. The "Lack of Funds" Defense is Dead: State instrumentalities routinely defend their failure to maintain civic infrastructure by pleading financial constraints. However, it is a settled principle of constitutional law that the State cannot plead financial inability when it comes to enforcing fundamental rights. By moving footpaths and road safety into Part III, the Court has stripped municipal bodies of their favorite defense.

The Opinion: Are We Diluting the Constitution?

While this development is a massive win for urban citizens frustrated by civic decay, as legal professionals, we must ask the hard question: Is the Supreme Court reducing the Constitution to a municipal grievance redressal mechanism?

When everything becomes a fundamental right, nothing is. In 2026 alone, we have seen menstrual health, road safety, and walking on footpaths all elevated to Part III status. While these are undeniably vital for human dignity, inserting them into the Constitution risks judicial overreach into areas strictly governed by state capacity and executive policy.

A High Court exercising writ jurisdiction cannot physically pour concrete, design traffic intersections, or magically summon the municipal budget required to build world-class footpaths. When constitutional courts issue sweeping mandates that the executive simply lacks the capacity to implement, it breeds contempt for the judicial process. We saw this during the pandemic, and we are likely to see it again when the next pedestrian inevitably falls victim to a crater-sized pothole.

The 2026 rulings are a double-edged sword. They provide the Bar with an incredibly sharp tool to hold apathetic civic bodies accountable, but they also place an impossible burden on the writ courts. The next time you draft a writ of mandamus against a municipal commissioner, remember to cite Article 19(1)(d)—but don't expect the footpath to be fixed by the time your matter is listed.