The Death of the 15-Day Rule: How the Supreme Court’s Reading of BNSS Sections 187(2) and 38 Tilts the Scales Toward Police

The End of the Anupam J. Kulkarni Era

For decades, the golden rule of criminal defense practice at the remand stage was simple: survive the first 15 days. Under Section 167 of the old Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), read with the Supreme Court’s landmark 1992 ruling in CBI v. Anupam J. Kulkarni, police custody could only be granted during the first 15 days following an arrest. Once that clock ran out, the accused was safely in judicial custody, effectively insulating them from investigative coercion. But the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS) has rewritten the rules of the game, and the Supreme Court’s latest 2026 interpretations have confirmed the defense bar’s worst fears.

In a recent and sweeping clarification, the Supreme Court held that the new criminal law framework under Section 187(2) BNSS unequivocally allows police custody beyond the initial 15-day period. The provision permits the 15-day police remand to be sought in tranches across the entire 60 or 90-day investigation period.

"This is not merely a procedural tweak; it is a seismic shift in the balance of power between the investigating agency and the accused. The police no longer need to rush their custodial interrogation, and defense counsel can no longer rely on the calendar to secure their client’s physical safety."

Why this matters for your practice: Your bail and remand strategies must fundamentally change. You can no longer just run out the clock. Opposing police remand now requires aggressive, substantive arguments on the merits and necessity of custody at every single application, even on day 45 of the investigation. You must demand the police show newly discovered evidence justifying a fresh stint in police lock-up, rather than allowing them to treat the accused like a library book they can check out whenever they please.

The Illusion of Counsel During Interrogation

Compounding the expansion of police custody is the Supreme Court’s July 2026 ruling on Section 38 BNSS (the equivalent of the old Section 41D CrPC). The Court held that while an accused has the right to meet an advocate of their choice during interrogation, the lawyer cannot remain present throughout the entire police interrogation.

While this aligns with the text of the statute and previous interpretations under the CrPC, affirming it in the BNSS era—where police custody can happen on day 50 or 60—creates a dangerous vacuum. If an accused can be yanked back into police custody weeks into an investigation, without the continuous presence of counsel, the risk of coerced confessions and custodial intimidation skyrockets. The constitutional safeguard under Article 20(3) against self-incrimination feels increasingly hollow when the defense lawyer is relegated to the waiting room.

Silver Linings for the White-Collar Practitioner

While the broader remand machinery has favored the State, the Supreme Court and High Courts have handed down crucial reprieves for white-collar and economic offense practitioners.

First, the Supreme Court has breathed life into Section 173(3) BNSS, stating that it must act as a safeguard against vague or doubtful allegations, explicitly warning against the mechanical registration of FIRs. For practitioners representing corporate clients, Section 173(3)—which allows for a preliminary enquiry before FIR registration in offenses punishable by 3 to 7 years—is your first line of defense. The Court's ruling means you can aggressively challenge automatic FIRs in commercial disputes dressed as criminal cheating.

Second, the Bombay High Court delivered a highly practical judgment regarding the freezing of bank accounts in cyber fraud and economic matters. The Court ruled that investigating agencies cannot debit-freeze bank accounts under Section 106 BNSS (power of police officer to seize certain property). Instead, such actions must follow the procedures laid out in Section 107 BNSS, which deals specifically with the attachment of property proceeds of crime and requires magisterial oversight.

Practice Note: If your client’s accounts are arbitrarily frozen by an IO citing general seizure powers, you now have direct binding precedent to move the High Court for immediate defreezing. The police cannot bypass the Magistrate when touching bank accounts.

Procedural Safeguards Still Matter

The Supreme Court also issued a stern reminder to Magistrates under Section 225 BNSS (formerly Section 202 CrPC). The Court held that a Magistrate must conduct an inquiry or direct an investigation before proceeding against an accused who resides outside the court’s territorial jurisdiction. This mandatory requirement remains a vital tool to quash frivolous private complaints filed in far-flung jurisdictions solely to harass your client.

Furthermore, in a massive development for PMLA practitioners, the Supreme Court ruled that PMLA cognizance taken after the commencement of the BNSS requires a pre-cognizance hearing of the accused. Coupled with the Court’s reiteration that bail cannot be denied indefinitely under UAPA/PMLA where trial delays violate Article 21, there is a clear judicial pushback against the weaponization of special statutes.

The Verdict

The 2026 BNSS jurisprudence reveals a bifurcated reality. For traditional IPC/BNS offenses—murder, theft, bodily harm—the State has been handed a sharper sword with staggered police custody and restricted counsel access. But for economic offenses and procedural overreach, the courts are strictly enforcing BNSS safeguards to prevent police from acting as judge, jury, and executioner.

As practitioners, the days of relying on CrPC muscle memory are over. The text of the BNSS is being interpreted strictly, and survival in the trial courts now demands mastering the nuances of these new procedural checkpoints.